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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the manner in which the technique of
Bayesian analysis may be applied to the forecasting of cruise
missile proliferation. Bayesian analysis is a quantitative
procedure in which alternative hypothetical outcomes are
postulated and their prior probabilities estimated. As
additional relevant events occur, the probabilities of their
association with each hypothesis are used to calculate a
revised probability for each alternative outcome. To support
a sample analysis, this thesis traces the historical
development of cruise missiles, discusses the various
motivations for their acquisition or indigenous production by
a developing nation, and identifies technologies crucial to
the building of an advanced cruise missile system. After
describing the Bayesian method and demonstrating its use in a
therretical example, the thesis concludes with some of the
polic, implications of cruise missile proliferation and its
forecasting by the intelligence community.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Unmanned aerodynamic guided weapons, also known as cruise
missiles, have existed as a concept since the invention of the
airplane. In the last thirty years, a series of technological
breakthroughs in propulsion, guidance, warhead and stealth
technology have made the cruise missile a potent offensive
strike weapon. The successful use of Tomahawk and AGM-86C
cruise missiles by the United States against Iraq in the
Persian Gulf war, as well as the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, guarantee that cruise missiles and cruise missile
technology will be both desired by, and available to, a number
of developing nations.
The purpose of this thesis is to propose a forecasting
technique by which the proliferation of modern cruise
missiles, and the transfer of sophisticated missile
technology, may be predicted, monitored and evaluated.
The forecasting technique described herein, Bayesian
analysis, has been used by the Central Intelligence Agency for
politico-military purposes; specifically, to provide
Indicat•ons and Warning (I&W) of the possible outbreak of
armed conflict. Bayesian analysis uses the assumption that an
observed event has varying probabilities of occurring
depending on the truth of alternative causative hypotheses.
Over time, by observation and probabilistic evaluation of many
iv
events, the "posterior probabilities" of each hypothetical
cause will be driven toward either zero (not likely to occur)
or one (very likely to occur).
This thesis addresses the context in which specific
events relating to cruise missile proliferation and indigenous
production may be evaluated. Major topics include:
1. The historical context of cruise missile employment.
2. The present state of the art of operational cruise
missiles (i.e., the Tomahawk).
3. The various motivations which might drive a lesser
developed nation to acquire, build or deploy modern cruise
missiles. These motivations include international prestige,
accelerated industrialization, military necessity, and
economic benefits.
4. The technologies, possession of which are essential to
the construction of a survivable, reliable and effective
cruise missile. Among these technological categories are
stealth, airframe and propulsion systems, guidance systems,
and warheads.
5. The nature of the database which would be required to
conduct a Bayesian analysis involving the forecasting of
cruise missile proliferation.
A theoretical case study demonstrates :he advantages and
drawbacks of Bayesian analysis with respect to intelligence
forecasting. The principal advantage of the method is the
establishxent of a forial analytical framework which
V
accommodates weighted inputs of all observed events, makes
differing interpretations of a given event more explicit, and
provides a readily available chronological record of the
analytical process. The use of this technique is limited,
though, to situations which can be expressed as a number of
mutually exclusive outcomes. An ample flow of data which is
logically related to the hypotheses to be tested must be
available, and analysts must be qualified to assign realistic




I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 1
II. THE CRUISE MISSILE .................................. 9
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS ........................ 9
1. The V-1 ................................... 9
2. Early American Cruise Missiles ........... 10
B. THE TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE ................... 14
1. Airframe ................................. 14
2. Guidance ................................. 15
3. Warhead .................................. 17
4. Launch Platforms ......................... 18
C. SOVIET CRUISE MISSILES ........................ 19
III. MOTIVATIONS FOR CRUISE MISrILE PROLIFERATION ....... 25
A. INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE ........................ 26
B. ACCELERATED INDUSTRIALIZATION ................. 27
C. MILITARY NEEDS ................................ 29
D. ECONOMIC BENEFITS ............................. 31
E. CONCLUSIONS ................................... 33
IV. CRUISE MISSILE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES ................ 35
A. STEALTH ....................................... 36
1. Miniaturization .......................... 38
2. Stealth Construction ..................... 39
3. Flight Path Design ........................ 40
4. Engine Design ............................ 42
vii
B. AIRFRAME AND PROPULSION ........................ 42
1. Liquid-fueled Rockets .................... 43
2. Conventional Jet Engines ................. 43
3. Ramjets .................................. 43
C. GUIDANCE ...................................... 45
1. Initial Guidance Systems ................. 45
2. Midcourse Updates ......................... 46
3. Terminal Guidance ......................... 48
D. WARHEAD ....................................... 49
1. Relationship Between Warhead and Missile
Design ................................... 49
a. Range Requirements .................. 50
b. Warhead Size and Weight ............. 50
c. Airframe Volume ...................... 51
2. Effects of Specific Warhead Types ........ 51
V. BAYESIAN ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL TOOL .......... 54
A. BAYESIAN ANALYSIS ............................. 55
B. THE IMP DATABASE .............................. 61
1. Purpose .................................. 61
2. Sources .................................. 62
3. Structure ............... .................... 62
4. Applicability ............................ 63
C. INDICATORS OF POSSIBLE CRUISE MISSILE
DEVELOPMENT ................................... 64
1. Basic Science and Technology ............. 65
2. Airframe and Propulsion Technology ....... 65
viii
3. Guidance Technology ....................... 66
4. Warhead Technology ........................ 66
5. Production and Testing Facilities/
Capabilities ............................. 67
6. Strategic, Diplomatic and Economic
Factors .................................. 67
7. "Interactive" Events ...................... 68
8. Miscellaneous ............................ 68
VI. BAYESIAN ANALYSIS: A SAMPLE APPLICATION ........... 69
A. SCENARIO ...................................... 69
B. HYPOTHETICAL ALTERNATIVES ...................... 70
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIOR PROBABILITIES .......... 70
D. EVENT-BY-EVENT BAYESIAN ANALYSIS .............. 72
E. CASE STUDY LESSONS LEARNED .................... 76
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ........................ 78
A. SUMMARY ....................................... 78
B. IMPLICATIONS .................................. 79
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .......... 80
LIST OF REFERENCES ............ ......................... 82
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................... 85
ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Professor Edward J. Laurance and
Professor Scott D. Tollefson of the Naval Postgraduate School
for their assistance, their guidance and, especially, their
patience in seeing this thesis through to completion.
I would also like to acknowledge the contributions of Mr.
Tim McCarthy of the International Missile Prolifeiatici1
ProJect (IMP) at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies in Monterey, California. His enthusiasm for this
project and his responsiveness to my queries simplified my
task considerably. Any errors of fact or logic are, of
course, mine alone.
My deepest than's go to Julie, Michael and Conor for
their love, patience and understandir3. This thesis reflects
their effcrts more so than it does my own.
x
I INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 1991, over 100 Tomahawk land-attack cruise
missiles (TLAMs) were launched by United States warships
against targets in Iraq. Over the next three 4eeks, nearly
two hundred more TLAM-, armed with either unitary high-
explosive warheads or combined effect packages of
submunitions, were 1,kunched in follow-on strikes. [Ref. l:pp.
'7-47] By some accounts, 85 percent of these sophisticated
weapons successfully struck their targets [Ref. 2:pp. 71-73].
The U.S. attack ushered in a new era in cruise missile
technology: for the first time, cruise missiles: with
conventional warheads had been employed, successfully and In
large numbers, to attack point targets ashore at over-the-
horizon ranges.
The apparent ease with which American cruise missiles
penetrated a sophisticated, Soviet-design integrated air
defense system (IADS) suggests a disturbing corollary. Other
cruise missile systems may exist, or soon may be developed,
The precise definition of "cruise missile" is open to
debate. The working definition adopted for this paper is from
Kos-ta Tsipis's article, "Cruise Missiles," which appeared in the
Fehruary, 1977 Scientific American: "a dispensable, pilotless,
self-guided, continuously powered, air-breathing warhead-delivery
vehicle that flies just like an airplane, supported by aerodynamic
forces." As noted in Huisken, The Oricin of the Strategic Cruise
Missile, this definition excludes rocket-propelled weapons like the
Fiench Exocet and the Soviet Styx. Such weapons will be discussed,
ho..ever, iL- recognition of the absence of a universally accepted
definition of cruise misslles.
which could penetrate, as easily and as effectively, an
American air defense system ashore or afloat. The manner in
which such missile systems might be identified, and their
developmental status monitored, is the subject of this thesis.
Cruise missiles have been used in combat since World War
II.- They have been built for both strategic and tactical
applications, and fitted with nuclear as well as conventional
warheads. Air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missile
systems have been designed and built. The potential value of
anti-ship cruise missiles, in particular, was suggested as
early as 1967 with the sinking of the Israeli destroyer EILAT
by an Egyptian SSN-2 Styx missile [Ref. 3:p. 29]. Yet, since
the late 1950s, the threat posed by cruise missiles has been
overshadowed by the existence of ballistic missiles:
specifically, by the adoption of intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) as the primary unmanned strategic (nuclear) deterrent
w~eapons of both the Soviet Union and the United States.
There are several good reasons why ballistic missiles,
rather than cruise missiles, were adopted for the role of
strategic strike. Ballistic missiles traveled
intercontinental ranges much more quickly than cruise missiles
and they were capable of achieving far greater accuracy than
The concept of an unmanned "flying bomb" dates back to the
dawn of the flying age, prior to World War I. For a concise
history of early cruise missile development attempts, see Kenneth
P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile, Chapter 2.
Werrell cites references as early as 1892.
2
inertially-guided cruise missiles [Ref. 3:p. 18]. Ballistic
missiles also would be much harder to shoot down than
aircraft-sized cruise missiles, whereas smaller (and therefore
more survivable) cruise missiles would have been unable to
carry nuclear warheads sufficiently large to accomplish their
prescribed strategic missions (given the inherent inaccuracy
cf inertial guidance at intercontinental ranges).
Now, however, advances in propulsion, guidance and
warhead technologies have led to the re-emergence of the
cruise missile as a versatile and effective long-range strike
weapon. Small, efficient turbofan engines, coupled with
improved inertial guidance systems and a variety of midcourse
and terminal position updating capabilities, have made
possible the accurate delivery of highly destructive payloads.
This capability, epitomized by the Tomahawk land-attack
missile, no longer resides exclusively with the United States
and its defense establishment. Several other nations, if
sufficiently motivated, could soon field a "modern" (i.e.,
reliable, accurate and survivable) land-attack cruise missile.
At least a few of these nations undoubtedly will do so. Seth
Carus, author of Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,
expressed his opinion on cruise missile proliferation:
It is the cruise missile, however, that will pose the
most serious challenge in the 1990s. The technologies
required to build conventionally armed cruise missiles
will be within the reach of a considerable number of
countries in the Third World.
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Cruise missile guidance systems will be readily
available .... mak[ing] it possible for cruise missiles to
achieve accuracies of less than 100 meters, even at long
ranges .... Tied together with cluster munitions, intelli-
gent submunitions, and fuel air explosives, cruise
missiles will have the accuracy and lethality to be
extraordinarily effective. [Ref. 4:p. 39; emphasis added]
Anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are also almost certain
to proliferate. The Soviet Union has fielded operational air-
launched ASCMs since 1958 and sea-.aunched ASCMs since 1960
[Ref. 5:pp. 157-8].' Improved systems have appeared
regularly. Even after the August 1991 coup attempt, work
reportedly continued on a next-generation Soviet sea-launched
ASCM, the SS-NX-25 [Ref. 6:p. 348].
The United States countered Soviet anti-ship cruise
missile developments by deploying the Harpoon weapon system in
1977 [Ref. 7:p. 233] and the anti-ship variant of the
Tomahawk, the TASM, 4 in 1983 [Ref. 8:p. 193]. Significantly,
while ASCM development has proceeded apace, anti-ship missile
defenses have lagged. The British experience in the Falklands
War and the 1987 STARK incident vividly demonstrated the
threat to naval forces posed by small, sophisticated, guided
SThe nuclear-armed SS-N-3c Shaddock was first tested in 1954,
and deployed aboard Whiskey and Echo I class submarines beginning
in 1960. The dual-capable (i.e., nuclear and conventional) SS-N-3a
Shaddock and the surface-launched SS-N-3b Sepal variants both
entered service in 1962. The first Soviet air-launched ASCM was
the conventionally-armed AS-I Kennel (1958). The nuclear-capable
AS-2 Kipper fuilowed in 1961. [Ref. 5:pp. 157-8]
TASM: Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile
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weapons. 5 In fact, the U.S. Navy's Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations for Surface Warfare [ACNO(SW)] recently declared
missile defense to be "a top modernization priority within
the...surface warfare community," surpassing even anti-
submarine warfare (ASW), which long held the top position on
such lists. (Ref. ll:p. 437]
A U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) in the
open ocean, defended by Aegis and New Threat Upgrade (NTU)
cruisers and long-range combat air patrol (CAP) aircraft, is
probably quite well protected against (although not
invulnerable to) anti-ship cruise missile attacks. An
amphibious task group approaching the coastline of some new
Third World trouble spot is not. Similarly vulnerable to
land-attack cruise missiles are the headquarters of a Marine
Expeditionary Group or other military force ashore, their
debarkation sites, and their airfields. During Operation
DESERT STORM, for example, Iraqi cruise missiles (had they
existed) could have been employed against the U.S. Central
Command headquarters compound in Riyadh, against the port
facilities at Al Jubayl, or against coalition air bases such
5 In 1982, Great Britain and Argentina waged a military
campaign for possession of the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands in the
South Atlantic. Two British ships, the frigate SHEFFIELD and the
cargo ship ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, were struck (and sunk) by AM-39
Exocet missiles launched from Argentinian Super Etendard aircraft.
The aircraft and missiles had been obtained from France in 1981.
(Ref. 9:p. 135)
In 1987, the USS STARK, a frigate, was struck by two Exocets
launched from an Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighter-bomber. 37 U.S. sailors
were killed and the ship was severely damaged by the missile hits
and resultant fires. [Ref. 10:p. 24)
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as the one at Dhahran. The ability of U.S. military forces
ashore or afloat to protect themselves against such attacks is
still quite limited.
In view of the possibilities described above, the U.S.
intelligence community must direct its assets and its efforts
to provide sufficient warning about nascent cruise missile
capabilities. Procedures should be established so that
disparate bits of data concerning such things as arms sales,
technology transfers, foreign political decisions and various
economic and diplomatic factors may be sorted and evaluated
within a logical framework for analysis. In this way,
forecasting of the threat posed by cruise missiles (either
land-attack or anti-ship) in a particular region can be more
specific, more accurate and, especially, more timely than
present methods of assessment.
Methods currently used are likely to include the
following:
1. The worst-case scenario, in which every potential cruise
missile threat is assumed to be based upon state of the art
technology (i.e., "If it can be built, it will be built--and
by everyone."); or
2. The best-case scenario, in which no threat is assumed
beyond that which has been demonstrated or observed (i.e., "If
we haven't seen it, then they don't have it.").
These approaches to assessing the degree of proliferation
of advanced cruise missiles represent the cautious extremes,
6
and have a certain intrinsic value as such. Both assumptions,
however, have notable shortcomings. The assumption that every
lesser developed country with a missile program is capable of
conducting the equivalent of a Tomahawk strike will severely,
and in most cases unnecessarily, complicate American military
actions, particularly with respect to counter-targeting and
the establishment of an adequate defensive posture for U.S.
forces. The other extreme could easily result in American (or
allied) military forces being surprised by a previously unseen
capability, with tragic results.
Therefore, I propose the implementation of a methodology
by which data can be compiled and then utilized to provide a
more realistic assessment and projection of emerging cruise
missile programs. Through the use of the techniques of
Bayesian analysis (described in Chapter V) it should be
possible, over time, to forecast the direction of a particular
nation's weapons development and acquisition strategy and to
provide on demand an assessment of that nation's progress in
fielding advanced cruise missile systems.
In order to demonstrate the manner in which Bayesian
analysis may be applied to assessing and forecasting cruise
missile programs, it will be necessary first to describe the
modern cruise missile in more detail. This description, in
Chapter II, will include a brief summary of the development of
cruise missiles; a description of the Tomahawk family of
missiles, which represent the state of the art for operational
7
land-attack cruise missiles6 ; and a summary of the cruise
missile inventory of the former Soviet Union.'
In Chapter III, a number of possible reasons why a
developing nation might seek to develop an indigenous
production capability for cruise missiles will be presented.
In Chapter IV, the critical technologies required to build
modern cruise missiles will be summarized.
Chapter V will include a description of the concepts of
Bayesian analysis, an example of the kind of database it
requires and a listing of specific indicators which relate to
cruise missile acquisition and development. Chapter VI will
apply Bayesian analysis to an illustrative case study. The
conclusion will summarize the thesis and provide some comments
on the role of intelligence forecasting in the larger arena of
national-level policymaking.
SThe Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM) also probably
represents the state of the art in its category. Unlike the TLAM,
however, the TASM has not yet been tested in combat.
7 Several other countries also produce cruise missiles of
varying degrees of sophistication. Among the more advanced are the
Israeli Gabriel and its South African and Taiwanese derivatives
(the Skorpioen and the Hsiung Feng, respectively), the French ASMP,
the Italian/French Otomat and the Japanese ASM-I. Space
constraints preclude a system-by-system analysis of these weapons.
The Soviet case warrants special attention because of the
sheer size of the inventory and the potential for massive
proliferation. [Source: The World's Missile Systems, 8th ed.,
General Dynamics Corp., 1988]
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II THE CRUISE MISSILE
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The concept of a cruise missile, or "flying bomb" has
been discussed since the invention of the airplane. Yet most
early attempts to build such a weapon were stymied by
technological limitations, most notably the inadequacy of
early automatic guidance systems. Ironically, during World
War I the most promising system for steering an unmanned,
bomb-laden airplane into a specific military target was the
use of radio controls located in an accompanying manned
aircraft, [Ref. 8:pp. 7-40] a method which offered little
advantage over the use of manned bombers.
1. The V-1
The first truly operable cruise missile was tte
German V-i "buzz-bomb," which was put into service during
World Wai II. It is "now generally accepted as the progenitor
of all cruise weapons." [Ref. 12:p. 3] The V-1 was propelled
by a pulse-jet engine at speeds up to 650 kilometers (390
miles) per hour and was guided by a pre-set magnetic compass.
Targeting was crude: the 900 kilogram conventional warhead
detonated on impact, which occurred soon after fuel exhaustion
had resulted in engine shutdown. [Ref. 12:pp. 3-4]
Approximately 8,000 V-is were launched by Germany,
primarily against London, and over 17,000 people were killed
9
by them. Eventually, though, the V-i. was defeated by a
coordinated defense composed of early-warning radar stations,
anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) batteries and pre-positioned
airborne interceptor aircraft. These defensive systems,
working in concert, were able to shoot down 95 percent of the
later V-1 cruise weapons launched. [Ref. l2:pp. 3-4]
2. Early American Cruise Missiles
Before the end of the war, the United States had
developed, but not deployed, its own cruise weapon, the JB-2
Loon. The Loon was essentially nothing more than an American
version of the V-1. In 1946, design work began on a new U.S.
ground-launched cruise missile, the SM-62 Snark. Powered by
a turbojet and carrying a stellar inertial guidance system,
in 1959 it became America's first operational intercontinental
missile system. The Snark was armed with a four meg:ýton (MT)
thermonuclear warhead. A planned follow-on cruise missile,
the Navajo, used a ramjet engine to achieve Mach 3 cruising
speed while employing a wholly inertial guidance system.
Navajo was canceled in July, 1957 as a result of the competing
demands of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
development program. [Ref. 3:pp. 15-18)
In 1954, the Air Force deployed to Europe its first
operational guided missile, the TM-61 Matador. The Matador
was a mobile, ground- launched, rocket-boosted and jet engine-
propelled medium range missile. Altnough Matador had the
potential to carry conventional or chemical warheads, its
10
primary purpose, along with the Army's Corporal missile and
Honest John artillery rocket, was to provide a tactical
nuclear capability to North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) ground forces. It had a theoretical range of 1,000
kilometers, but that range was severely reduced by the
missile's command guidance system, which required continuous
radar tracking from the launch site. [Ref. 3:pp. 21-22]
A second tactical nuclear weapon-bearing cruise
missile, the TM-76 Mace, was deployed to Europe in 1959 and
subsequently to Taiwan and South Korea as well. The Mace A
version used a new guidance system known as automatic terrain
recognition and navigation, or ATRAN:
ATRAN consisted of a search radar, a map-matching
device and a terrain clearance controller. During flight,
the map-matching device compared the images provided by
the search radar with a radar photograph of the terrain
overflown that was inserted prior to launch. Errors
between the two images were broken down into longitudinal
and lateral components and the missile's course adjusted
accordingly. [Ref. 3:pp. 22-23]
The Mace A, with ATRAN, had an effective range, using a high-
low approach, of about 1,200 kilometers. An all-inertial
guidance, high-altitude version, the Mace B, had a range of
about 2,200 kilometers. [Ref. 3:pp. 22-23]
The U.S. Navy's first operational cruise missile was
the SSM-8A Regulus I, in service from 1955 until 1966.
"Regulus I carried a nuclear warhead at high subsonic speed to
a maximum range of 440 nautical miles." [Ref. 3:p. 20] It was
powered by a turbojet engine and normally would be stored on
the deck of a submarine until readied for launch (while
11
surfaced). It was also sometimes carried aboard cruisers and
aircraft carriers. A successor missile, the XSSM-9 Regulus
II, was to have had over twice the range of Regulus I and a
speed of Mach 2, but it was canceled as the Polaris submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) neared operational status.
[Ref.3:p. 20]
From 1960 until 1976 the U.S. Air Force deployed the
AGM-28A/B Hound Dog air-to-surface cruise missile, two of
which could be carried by a B-52 strategic bomber [Ref. 3:pp.
18-19]. The Hound Dog weighed 4,500 kilograms and carried a
one MT nuclear warhead. Its turbojet was capable of
sustaining low level flight at a speed of Mach 1.6 for a range
of up to 800 kilometers. The weapon had a CEP2 of about 1.5
km. (Ref. 12:p. 6]
As suggested in Chapter I, cruise missiles began to
fall from favor in the late 1950s and beyond, at least among
American military leaders (both in and out of uniform).
Technological advances in other weapon systems apparently had
rendered them obsolete. By 1970 the cruise missile had been
virtually abandoned as a potential U.S. strategic weapon
system. From that time until now, however, a complex
interplay of technological, strategic and diplomatic factors
conjoined to bring aboLt the situation which exists today.
Such factors include the development of small, efficient
Circular Error Probable: the radius of a circle, centered
on the target, within which one half of all shots aimed at that
target are expected to fall.
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turbofan engines and highly accurate guidance systems; the
changing capabilities and vulnerabilities of other U.S.
strategic systems; and the signing of a number of arms control
accords which, among other things, attached greater relative
value to cruise missiles and other non-traditional means of
nuclear weapons delivery by imposing limits on the traditional
methods (i.e., bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs). [Ref. 3:pp. 28-59, 186-
192;Ref. 12:pp. 20-28]
The United States currently possesses two long-
range, land-attack cruise missile systems: the AGM-86 air-
launched cruise missile, or ALCM; and the BGM-109 Tomahawk
sea-launched cruise missile, or SLCM. Both of these systems
were originally conceived as delivery vehicles for nuclear
warheads. 2 Ironically, while the nuclear variants have been
"stood down" and are not deployed presently, conventional
versions of both the AGM-86 ALCM and the BGM-109 Tomahawk were
launched against targets in Iraq during DESERT STORM.'
While the AGM-86 ALCM and the BGM-109 SLCM both are
examples of extremely sophisticated operational cruise
missiles, the Tomahawk is the more publicized of the two.
2 In much of the literature on strategic cruise missiles and
arms control, the terms SLCM and ALCM are used, without
modification, to refer specifically to the nuclear-armed variants
of each of these weapon systems.
3 In January, 1992 the U.S. Air Force revealed that it had
launched 35 non-nuclear AGM-86C missiles from seven B-52G bombers.
The existence of the conventional variant of the AGM-86 had been
classified until the time of that announcement. [Ref. 13:p. 105]
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Therefore, it has been selected to demonstrate the existing
state of the art in cruise missile technology and performance.
B. THE TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE
The name Tomahawk" refers to an entire family of sea-
launched cruise missiles: a nuclear-armed land-attack variant
(BGM-109A or TLAY.-N) , a conventionally-armed anti-ship missile
KB•-I09B/TASM) , a conventional land-attack variant with a
unitary high explosive warhead (BGM-109C/TLAM-C), and another
land-attack variant which carries combined-effect packages of
submunitions (BGM-109D/TLAM-D) [Ref. 14 :p. 332;Ref. l:p. 47].
Tomahawk also provided the basis for the Ground-Launched
Cruise Missile (BGM-109G/GLCM) , a theater nuclear weapon first
deployed to Europe in December, 1983 [Ref. 8:pp. 186, 201-
205] , and subsequently withdrawn. Modified Tomahawks have
also been designed for air launch from such platforms as the
Navy's A-6E attack aircraft and the Air Force's B-52 strategic
bomber [Ref. 8:pp. 207-8].
1. Airframe
All of the Tomahawk SLCMs are built around a conmon
airframe. The missile is powered by & Williams Co. F-107-WR-
101 turbofan engine which weighs 275 kilograms and generates
600 pounds of thrust.. [Ref. 12 :pp. 8-12] This engine enables
the Tomahawk to cruise at speeds between 0.5 and C.75 Mach
(380-5-5 mph or 340-510 knots) [Ref. 15] at altitudes between
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100 and 300 feet above local ground level (Ref. l:p. 47].•
Other common airframe components include the deployable air
injection scoop and tolding wings, and the rocket booster
which propels the missile to cruise velocity upon launch. The
Tomahawk missile, with booster, is 20.5 feet long and has a 21
inch diameter. With wings deployed, the airframe has a span
of 8.6 feet [Ref. 15].
2. Guidance
All variants of the Tomahawk have an inertial
guidance system which uses accelerometer inputs to update
continuously an initial position input prior to launch.
Because "the best currently-used inertial guidance systems
tend to 'wander' up to 900 meters off course for every hour of
flight time" [Ref. 1 2 ;p. 12], all the land attack variants are
equipped with a terrain contour matching (TERCOM) system which
provides periodic positional updates to the inertial system.
TERCOM was patented in 1958 by LTV-Electro Systems Company for
use in the SLAM (Supersonic Low Altitude Missile) strategic
attack missile. Although the SLAM system was canceled,
development of TERCOM was carried forward. Ultimately, TERCOM
was adopted for use in both the ALCM and the SLCM/GLCM. [Ref.
8:p. 136]
1 The speed of sound at sea level is 343 meters per second (in
dry air, at 20 degrees Celsius and one atmosphere of pressure).
There are 1760 yards in a statute mile and 2000 yards in a nautical
mile. One meter = 3.28 feet. [Source: Halliday and Resnick,
Fundamentals of Physics, 3rd ed., New lork, 1988.)
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The principles of operation of the combinod TERCOM
and inertial navigation system, sometimes known as TAINS,ý are
elucidated in Kenneth Werrell's The Evolution of the Cruise
Missile:
In the TERCOM system, engineers divide a terrain map
into a matrix of cells which have ranged in size from 100
feet to 3,200 feet on a side .... The E-Systems matrix
consists of 64 cells, each 400-feet on a side, yielding a
4.9 nm strip map. Engineers assign each cell an average
elevation derived from a contour map or satellite
reconnaissance map, and this information is stored in the
system's computer. In flight, a radar altimeter measures
the actual elevations and then at checkpoints matches that
sequence with a digital map stored in the computer ....
The inertial guidance system navigates the missile to
the first TERCOM checkpoint and between subsequent
checkpoints en route to the target. At each checkpoint,
the computer updates the inertial guidance system and
corrects the missile's course. Theoretical accuracy of
TERCOM is 0.4 times the size of the cells, which are
progressively reduced in size the closer the map set is to
the target. [Ref. 8:p. 136]
For the accurate delivery of the W-80 nuclear
warhead aboard the BGM-109A, the inertial system with TERCOM
updates is adequate. In order for a conventional cruise
missile to accomplish its mission, though, a much more
accurate terminal guidance system is required. The system
incorporated into the BGM-109C and BGM-109D (TLAM-C and TLAM-
D) is known as Digital Scene-Matching Area Correlator, or
DSMAC. The DSMAC system uses an optical camera to detect
images of the ground at prescribed points along the missile's
planned flight path to the target. rhese images are digitized
and compared to images stored in the guidance computer's
TAINS: TERCOM-Aided Inertial System
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memory. Offsets from the desired path are calculated and a
correcting course is determined. [Ref. 2:pp. 72-731
The range and accuracy attainable by a Tomahawk
land-attack missile using TERCOM and DSMAC has been
characterized as follows: if launched from the vicinity of
St. Louis, Missouri, a TLAM equipped with TERCOM alone could
fly to Washington, D.C., and hit a target the size of JFK
Stadium. If fitted with DSMAC as well, the missile could be
flown through the goalposts at either end of the football
field inside. [Ref. 16:p. 4]
The BGM-109B anti-ship variant uses an entirely
different guidance system. Since it is employed against ships
maneuvering at sea, TERCOM and DSMAC would be useless.
Therefore, the TASM is equipped with an active radar seeker (a
modified version of the kind installed on the shorter-range
Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile) . It flies a pre-programmed
route to the expected target area, at which time the radar is
activated and a search for targets is commenced. [Ref. 14:pp.
332]
3. Warhead
As mentioned above, the TLAM-N is armed with a W-80
nuclear warhead, which at least one reference credits with a
200 kiloton yield [Ref. 12:pp. 14-19). Both the TLAM-C and
the TASM carry a unitary WDU-25/B (Bullpup) 1000 pound high
explosive warhead for use against high-value point targets.
The TLAM-D, on the other hand, carries up to 24 separately
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dispersed packages of submunitions, up to 166 3.4 pound
bomblets in all. [Ref. 17:p. 38) These bomblets may be armor-
piercing, fragmentation or incendiary [Ref. 1:p. 47), and are
likely to be used against concentrations of small, vulnerable
high-value targets, such as revetted aircraft or stationary
tanks.
4. Launch Platforms
Having described the common airframe of the Tomahawk
cruise missile, itr various guidance schemes and payloads, we
turn our attention to the launch platforms. Tomahawk sea-
launched cruise missiles can be launched from a vertical
launching system (VLS), a deck-mounted armored box launcher
(ABL) or a submarine's torpedo tube. In fact, two of the
physical limitations on the size of the missile--its length
and its diameter when stowed--were dictated by the operational
requirement that it be capable of storage in, and launch from,
a submarine torpedo tube (Ref. 3:p. 32]. Specific classes of
U.S. naval vessels which were to be configured for Tomahawk
include the following: all Sturgeon (SSN-637) and Los Angeles
(SSN-688) class nuclear submarines, including some VLS-
equipped 688s; all Spruance (DD-963) and Arleigh Burke (DDG-
51) class destroyers (VLS); all VLS-equipped Ticonderoga (CG-
47) class cruisers (i.e., CG-52 and above); several nuclear
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cruisers (ABLs); and the four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships
with a staggering 32 ABL "tubes" apiece. 6 [Ref. 18:pp. 486-71
In conjunction with the large number and variety of
launch platforms, procurement of a sizable inventory of
missiles is planned. Prior to Operation DESERT STORM, the
U.S. Navy had been building toward a total of 4,030 Tomahawks
of all varieties by the end of fiscal year 1994 (i.e., by
September 30, 1994)' (Ref. 15]. While almost 300 conventional
TLAMs were expended during DESERT STORM, it is reasonable to
surmise that the total Tomahawk inventory is approaching its
previously planned level.
C. SOVIET CRUISE MISSILES
In terms of weapon system capab91.'ties, Tomahaw-.k
represents the greatest potential danger posed by cruise
missiles and by the transfer of cruise missile technology.
This is especially true for land-attack missiles. With
respect to existing cruise missile inventories and the
likelihood of their proliferation, though, the most serious
threat to the security of U.S. military forces resides in the
stockpiles of the former Soviet Union.
SThe Iowa class battleships, all of which were fitted with
ABLs, have been decommissioned. Two of them--Wisconsin and
Missouri--launched TLAMs against Iraq during DESERT STORM (Ref.
:pp. 20-21].
STo include 758 TLAM-N, 593 TASM, 1,493 TLAM-C, and 1,186
TLAM-D
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The Soviet Union has been building and deploying air- and
sp•-launched anti-ship cruise missiles since 1958 and 1960
respectively. While almost always lagging behind U.S.
technological capabilities, the size, speed and range of these
weapons have long posed a serious hazard to U.S. naval forces.
Much of the U.S. Navy's tactical doctrine, in fact, has been
desioned to counter the threat of attack by these weapons.
The Aegis weapon system, likewise, was designed explicitly to
prevent saturation of U.S. aircraft carrier battle group
defenses by Soviet cruise missiles.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union, with its
resultant political upheaval, economic turmoil, and eruption
of ethnic and national rivalries, raises the frightening
prospect of a virtual free market in arms trading. The
government of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has
been largely unsuccessful in converting military production
facilities to domestic applications. Government-sanctioned
exports of existing weapons inventories (including, for
example, high-performance aircraft such as the MiG-29
"Fulcrum" and Su-27 "Flanker" (Ref. 19:p. 430]) are viewed
increasingly and accurately as a major source of much-needed
foreign hard currency. [Ref. 20:pp. 253-4] Furthermore,
"[t)he decay in the functional unity and morale of the former
Soviet military raises the question of the fate of its
conventional weapons and the prospect of their proliferation
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among local warlords, criminals and terrorists." [Ref. 21:p.
231; emphasis added]
Most reports of arms sale proposals and of attempts to
acquire weapon system stockpiles by force have involved more
conventional weapons, such as tanks and aircraft. The same
economic and political forces also apply, though, to the
proliferation of "unconventional" weapons, including nuclear,
chemical and biological warheads, ballistic missiles and, of
course, cruise missiles. Therefore, prudence dictates that
any assessment of the threat posed by cruise missile
proliferation should include an accounting of the existing
inventory of Soviet cruise missiles.
Like the United States, the Soviet Union recognized the
cruise missile's potential as a nuclear weapon delivery
vehicle. The Soviets, however, placed much more emphasis on
the missile's tactical applications, particularly at sea.
Furthermore, the Soviets did not shelve cruise missiles once
they fielded ICBMs and SLBMs. Rather, they continued to
develop anti-ship cruise missiles--both air- and sea-launched
versions--primarily for use against U.S. Navy surface ship
battle groups. Air-launched cruise missiles deployed for this
purpose include the AS-4 Kitchen (1967), the AS-5 Kelt (1968)
and the AS-6 Kingfish (1968). Comparable sea-launched cruise
missiles are the SS-N-7 Starbright (1968) , SS-N-9 Siren (1969)
and the SS-N-12 Sandbox (1976). [Ref. 5:p. 156)
21
In 1980 the Soviet Union deployed a new generation of
sea-launched cruise missiles: the SS-N-19 Shipwreck and the
SS-N-22 Sunburn. "While these missiles offered significantly
improved anti-ship capabilities, they [were] primarily modern
versions of a long line of relatively short-range weapons
designed for surface ship attacks." [Ref. 5:p. 156] Shortly
thereafter, though, development began on "a new generation of
long-range, nuclear-armed, air-, sea-, and ground-launched,
land-attack cruise missiles.. .similar to current U.S. long-
range missiles." (Ref. 5:p. 156] These include the AS-15 Kent
and the SS-N-21 Sampson, which both now have been deployed, as
well as the SSC-X-4 ground-launched cruise missile, the
deployment of which was suspended by the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty [Ref. 5:p. 156].
The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., in its 1989
Nuclear Weapons Databook, attempted an assessment of the total
number of Soviet cruise missiles deployed, by type. Estimates
for each type of sea-launched cruise missile were obtained by
counting the number of launch platforms (i.e., ships and
submarines) and assuming that one missile exists for each
launcher.' This methodology assumes, of course, that there
are neither significant shortages nor stockpiles of cruise
missiles. Its accuracy depends, therefore, on the validity of
those twin assumptions.
8 For example, if a Charlie I class submarine can carry eight
SS-N-7s, and there are nine Charlie I subs (Ref. 22:p. 131], then
there are probably around 72 SS-N-7s in the Soviet inventory.
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Applying the above-described methodology but using more
current order of battle data from the International Institute
of Studies (The Military Balance 1991), an estimate of the
Soviet sea-launched cruise missile inventory at the time of
the August 1991 coup can be compiled. Particularly noteworthy
are the resulting estimates of around 250 SS-N-19 Shipwreck
ASCMs, which have a range of 550 kilometers; up to 80 SS-N-21
Sampson land-attack cruise missiles (3000 kilometer range)
and a total inventory of over 1100 sea-launched cruise
missiles.
Further evidence of a substantial inventory of modern
sea-launched cruise missiles is the completion in 1991 of
another SS-N-19-capable Oscar II SSGN, along with an Akula and
a Victor III SSN, both of which can carry SS-N-21s [Ref. 6:p.
348]. Moreover, the Russian Federation alone is assessed to
have some 84 ALCM-equipped TU-95M "Bear" bombers [Ref. 23:p.
14J, whereas in 1989 "an inventory of some thousands of ASMs
[were] estimated to exist, armed with 2000 nuclear warheads."
[Ref. 5:p. 157]
The economic incentives for elements of the former Soviet
Union to sell off some of this inventory are clear. So too
are the motivations for newly unemployed Soviet weapons
designers to market their expertise around the world. On the
other side of the equation--the arms and technology buyers--
the agendas are not so simple. There are many reasons why a
developing nation might choose to buy advanced cruise missiles
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or to acquire the capability to build them. Their tactical
value in time of war is only one such reason, and probably not
the most important one.
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III MOTIVATIONS FOR CRUISE MISSILE PROLIFERATION
Seth Carus, a previously-cited expert on missile
proliferation, has identified three reasons why a country
might seek to acquire a ballistic missile inventory. His
reasons included "strategic status" "strategic deterrence,
and "military value" [Ref. 4:pp. 3-11]. Dr. Scott Tollef son,
a professor of Latin American studies at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, explained Brazil's pursuit of
an indigenous ballistic missile production capability in
similar terms. He described "political," "economic,"
"security" and "technological'' factors which influenced the
Brazilian government's course of action. [Ref. 24:pp. 21-27)
With the development of accurate, long-range land-attack
cruise missiles, the same factors which influence ballistic
missile acquisition and development can be applied equally
well to cruise missiles. This is especially true for missiles
which have been, or can be, mated with nuclear, chemical or
other unconventional warheads.
Following the lead of Carus and Tollefson, there are at
least four reasons why a developing nation might choose to
pursue the capability to produce cruise missile indigenously.
These reasons include increasing the nation's international
status or prestige, serving as a vehicle for accelerated
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industrialization, filling a specific military need, and
giving the nation some form of economic benefit.
A. INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE
For over forty-five years, nuclear weapons have been a
sine qua non of superpower status. The ballistic missile, as
a primary nuclear weapon delivery vehicle, has shared in "the
bomb's" sense of prestige. In South America, for example,
"devoid of major external conflicts, the prestige rationale
drives much of the arms transfers within the region and the
missile programs in Argentina and Brazil." [Ref. 24:p. 22;
emphasis added] A nuclear-capable cruise missile production
capability would command as much respect from allies,
neighbors and regional competitors as do today's indigenous
ballistic missile programs (such as Israel's Jericho missile
system).
Even without a known or suspected nuclear weapon
capability, a country's possession and, especia'lly, its
production of advanced cruise missiles is sure to be noticed.
Again drawing an analogy to ballistic missiles, the possession
by Iraq of SCUD missiles (and its ability to modify them)
weighed heavily on the diplomatic and, to a lesser extent, the
military preparations of the United Nations coalition forces
prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Only after the war began,
and the inaccuracies of the Iraqi SCUD became apparent, did
concern over the SCUD diminish.
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Had the Iraqis been using modern cruise missiles instead,
with precision guidance systems, low visibility flight paths
and tiny radar cross-sections, their impact on the conflict
would have been much greater. Against a more evenly matched
foe, the effect of cruise missiles could have proven decisive.
The recognition of that possibility, by the leaders of
regional military powers, will serve to attach to cruise
missile possession and production the same prestige now
associated with ballistic miss les and, by extension, nuclear
weapons.
B. ACCELERATED INDUSTRIALIZATION
Many of the world's lesser developed countries (LDCs)
look to the Western industrialized nations with a sense of
longing, if not outright envy. The leaders of these LDCs
contrast the relative affluence of Western Europe, Japan and
the United States with their nations' poverty and resultant
instability--and they seek change. As of 1990, "more than 100
countries [were) committed to programs of economic development
intended to break the vicious cycle of poverty." Their way
out, their "supreme national goal," was industrialization.
[Ref. 2 5 :p. 518]
In 1978 the economist E. Benoit published a study which
indicated that, contrary to expectations, increases in defense
spending in LDCs "ha[d) a positive effect on the rate of
growth of material product (income) ." [Ref. 26:p. 214] Benoit
attributed the economic benefits of defense spending to such
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things as the care and feeding of the troops, higher standards
of education and medical care, improvements made to the
nation's infrastructure in the name of national security, and
subsidization by the military of otherwise useful scientific
and technical research and development. (Ref. 26:p. 215]
Others have seen investment in high-technology defense-
related industries as the way out of poverty and into the
First World. nTo become mature economies, the developing
nations must undertake a massive transformation of their
societies .... To succeed.. .they need the capital goods and
technology of the developed, industrial countries." (Ref.
25:p. 523] The fastest way to obtain such capital goods and
technology, many LDC leaders seem to believe, is to develop
the capability to produce indigenously, often under a
licensing or co-production agreement, the same military
hardware used by the industrialized countries. (Ref. 27:p. 4)
Iran was one of the first LDCs to embark on such a
program, commencing in 1970. Shah Reza Mohammad Pahlavi's
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) program "involved
an unprecedented, large-scale transfer of technology by some
of the West's biggest defence conglomerates to a Third World
state." [Ref. 2 8 :pp. 158-9] Such technology transfers to
Third World licensed arms producers have now become
commonplace; the willingness to provide such transfers is in
many cases a prerequisite for doing business [Ref. 29:p. 72].
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Cruise missiles would appear to be an ideal weapon
system, the production of which could lead to industrial and
technological advances in the civilian sector of an LDCs
economy. Agreements with developed nations could range from
final assem)'ly work, to manufacturing of airframe and
populsion subsystems, to indigenous production of complex
microelectronic guidance circuitry. The knowledge, skills and
industrial capacitie6 needed to build cruise missiles could
then be channeled into both missile production for host-nation
use and civilian applications.
C. MILITARY NEEDS
As was already noted, possession of cruise missiles could
give a nation (or at least its leaders) an enhanced sense of
international prestige or status. While such prestige is
itself a reasoih why a nation might choose to pursue a cruise
missile development and/or acquisition program, there is a
more fundamental reason for such a course of action. Quite
simply, cruise missiles are a powerful military instrument.
Many nations already possess some form of cruise or
prolonged glide weapon. The ubiquitous Styx missile, a two-
and-a-half ton, turbojet propelled anti-ship missile with a
400 to 500 kg high explosive warhead and either active radar
or infrared (IR) homing (depending on the variant), has been
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in service since 1958.' As of 1988, it was being used by at
least 22 nations for coastal defense missions. The worldwide
inventory of Styx missiles numbers in the thousands. (Ref.
14:p. 318]
Likewise, the French-made Exocet 2-- a ground-, air-,
surface-, and submarine-launched family of rocket *-'opelled,
sea-skimming, active radar homing anti-ship missiles--has been
sold to no less than 24 other countries around the world [Ref.
14:p. 66]. It has been proven in combat to be a highly
effective weapon.
The Tomahawk, of course, has validated the concept of a
conventionally-armed, precision-guided, land-attack cruise
missile. Consequently, there are dozens of nations which
might reasonably conclude that an advanced cruise missile--
either a land-attack version, an anti-ship version, or both--
is a valid military requirement. Likely candidates for the
anti-ship version are those countries which now deploy the
Styx, the Exocet, the U.S. Harpoon, the Italian/French Otomat,
or any derivative of the Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile.
I The dates of Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for each
variant are as follows: SS-N-2a--1958; SS-N-2b--1964; SS-N-2c--
1967. [Ref. 14:p. 318]
2 There are at least four variants of the Exoctt.
1. MM38: IOC 1974, 42 km maximum range, original ship-launched
missile.
2. AM39: IOC 1976, 50-70 km max. range, air-launched variant.
3. SM39: IOC 1986
4. MM40: IOC 1981, 70 km max. range, extended-range version of
MM38; ship- or truck-launched capability (for coastal
defense). [Ref. 14:pp. 66-68]
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Other candidate nations for new anti-ship cruise missile
programs are those countries involved in any sort of sea
control dispute (e.g., possession of the Spratly Islands,
which are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Phillippines,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei).
Countries which might see a legitimate military
requirement for an advanced land-attack cruise missile program
include those which have active ballistic missile development
programs or other strategic strike programs (e.g., Brazil,
China, Taiwan), or countries involved in regional arms races
or border disputes (e.g., Argentina, Chile and Peru [Ref.
30:p. 228]; India and Pakistan).
Finally, any country which previously has purchased (or
been given) anti-ship or deep land-attack weaponry from either
the United States or the former Snviet Union may be embarked
already on a program to produce cruise missiles indigenously
in an effort "to reduce their dependency on a single
supplier.. .and thereby to avoid any supplier-imposed
conditions that might curtail their freedom of political and
military action." [Ref. 27:p. 4]
D. ECONOMIC BENEFITS
The international arms trade can be a lucrative business.
Marketing of the right weapon system, at the right time, can
prove to be very rewarding financially for the manufacturer
of that weapon, and for the manufacturer's host nation.
Indigenous arms production offers additional economic benefits
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to a national government which previously had to import
military hardware from abroad: conservation of foreign
currency and a more positive balance of trade.
One of the biggest disadvantages of indigenous production
often is the inability to achieve economies of scale. Even
for large Western industrialized nations (such as France),
producing weapons for domestic requirements alone would be
terribly inefficient. This is why France, West Germany and
other advanced nations (including, in many cases, the United
States) are quite willing to market their most advanced weapon
systems to anyone who can afford them. [Ref. 2 7 :p. 6]
For small LDCs, the situation is problematic: foreign
purchases lead to balance of payments problems or depletion of
currency reserves, along with a degree of depende, •;
indigenous production is inefficient and diverts much-needed
capital, resources and skilled labor from other pressing
domestic needs. [Ref. 31:p. 329]
Nevertheless, a nation able to secure a niche in the
international arms transfer market may be able to overcome the
negative aspects of domestic production. In 1989,
at least 120 countries participated in the arms
trade .... All 120 were importers, and 47 of them also
exported. Ninety-three of those participating in the
trade were less developed countries, and they accounted
for three-quarters of all arms imports and one-tenth of
arms exports, by value .... International transactions in
arms.. .accounted for about [1.5] percent of world trade in
1989. [Ref. 32:p. 47]
For the country first able to field and market a highly
desirable product (such as the Exocet), there may be much
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money to be made from international sales. That prospect
could provide a powerful incentive to the leaders of some
developing coun.try rich with idled skilled workers but
suffering from moderate balance of payments problems.'
One example of a country attempting to do exactly that is
North Korea, which in 1989 was trying to develop an indigenous
production capability for the Chinese HY-2 "Silkworm" anti-
ship missile. The goal of such production was to offer the
missile "for possible sale to such countries as Iran." [Ref.
33:pp. 204--207)
E. CONCLUSIONS
It is impossible to predict with any certainty, based
only on the broad motivations sketched out above, precisely
which countries, if any, will decide to acquire advanced
cruise missile systems or attempt to build such systems
indigenously. It is possible, however, to evaluate a
country's physical capability to do so, by considering their
technological base, necessary production experience, and
required engineers and technical management teams to
produce most [weapon] systems as redesigned copies, or
with increased use of domestic or foreign components.
[Ref. 27:p. 8]
SLooney and Fredericksen, Ref. 31, argue that for countries
that are not constrained by their international borrowing capacity,
there is no negative correlation between increased defense spending
and economic growth (i.e., growth will not be hindered by increased
defense spending). Countries which are resource constrained, on
the other hand, (i.e., a troublesome level of foreign debt), will
be significantly negatively affected by increases in defense
spending.
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The Science Applications International Corporation did so, and
grouped developing nations into four "tiers" of potential "new
suppliers" of arms [Ref. 27 :p. 8). Only the first tier would
"be capable of relatively autonomous production of a wide
range of military equipment," while the second tier would be
capable of a "comparable level ot production sophistication,
but only for selected types of equipment." [Ref. 27:pp. 8-9]
The first and second tiers consisted of six and four
countries, respectively [Ref. 27:pp. 8-9).4 Therefore, by
focusing attention on the few countries likely to be capable
of cruise missile production and looking for evidence of
action on any of the motivating factors described herein, it
should be possible to identify nascent missile production
programs in their earliest stages.
First tier countries included China, Brazil, Israel, India,
South Korea and Yugoslavia. Second tier countries included
Argentina, Taiwan, North Korea and Egypt. [Ref. 27 :pp. 8-9]
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XV CRUISE MISSILE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
Once it has been determined, or even suggested, that a
particular nation has decided to embark on a cruise missile
acquisition and/or indigenous production program, the next
logical step is to analyze the direction which the program is
taking. An assessment should be made of the intended nature _
of the missile system: its mission, characteristics and
capabilities. A judgment can then be offered, and over time
revised, of the subject nation's ability to meet its goals in
building a modern cruise missile.
Any cruise missile system can be evaluated on its
capabilities in a number of specific characteristics or
categories. The results of these evaluations, individually
and holistically, define the technological sophistication of
the weapon system and provide a suggestion of the threat posed
by it.' In general terms, a modern cruise missile system is
one which is capable of delivering its payload, reliably and
accurately, to a target at long range. Implicit in the term
reliability is the concept of survivability: not only must
the missile be substantially free from electro-mechanical
SThe actual threat posed by any given weapon system is a
function of many variables, including, for example, the system's
theoretical capabilities, the training and morale of its operators,
the quality of leadership exercised, and the logistical support
available. This list is merely suggestive, not comprehensive.
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failure; but it also must be capable of penetrating, with high
probability, a robust active defensive system.
There are three fundamental categories of technological
capability which are essential to the construction of a modern
cruise missile system. The three categories are airframe and
propulsion, guidance, and warhead technology. A fourth
category, overlapping and intertwined with the first three, is
low-observable, or stealth, technology. Additional
capabilities not integral to the missile itself are also
required if the development program is to be successful.
Technical and operational test and evaluation facilities are
an excellent example of such capabilities.
Because of the omnipresent nature of stealth technology--
the need to consider observability in almost every aspect of
missile design--it is to this topic we first turn our
attention.
A. STEALTH
Any weapon system, no matter how sophisticated, is
worthless if it cannot put ordnance on target a sufficient
percentage of the time. Strategic land-attack systems often
face a daunting array of defensive measures, ranging from
early warning to detection and tracking to soft or hard kill
of the delivery vehicle. Consequently, each strategic system
is endowed with certain characteristics which enhance its
survivability. ICBMs fly too high and too fast, and approach
at too steep an angle, to be threatened seriously by shootdown
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(so far). (Ref. 4:p. 10) Their time of flight allows minimal
reaction time, and they can complicate tracking by releasing
decoys. Manned strategic bombers fly very low and very fast,
and have the further advantage of man-in-the-loop control.
They also undoubtedly possess very sophisticated electronic
countermeasures (ECM) gear for self-defense, and some are able
to "shoot their way in," so to speak, through the use of air-
launched missiles targeted at specific air defense sites.
Cruise missiles, whether land-attack or anti-ship, have
few of the advantages of either ICBMs or manned bombers. They
travel at sub-sonic speeds, along pre-determined flight paths,
and have no self-defense capabilities. A cruise missile's
survival depends almost entirely upon its total avoidance of
detection throughout its ingress to the target.
There are two principal ways by which a cruise missile
can be detected and tracked by an air defense system. The
first is by reflection of electromagnetic (EM) energy, i.e.,
radar, off of the r-rget. Radar detection depends upon the
radar cross section (RCS) of the missile and its entry within
line-of-sight (LOS) distance from the search radar antenna.'
2 Radar detection of a target depends upon a large number of
factors, including transmitted power, range to the target, radar
receiver sensitivity, operator training and alertness, antenna size
and characteristics of the transmitted radar pulse. Most of these
parameters are beyond the control of a cruise missile designer.
Radar cross section is a nominal value ascribed to a
particular airframe. It is used primarily as a tool for comparison
with other airframes. Actual RCS of a given target to a given
radar fluctuates wildly with target aspect (i.e., nose-on, look-
down or beam reach.
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The other way in which a cruise missile readily may be
detected is by its emission of thermal infrared (IR) EM
energy. Such detection depends primarily upon the temperature
of the missile (more accurately, its exhaust) relative to its
surroundings. Cruise missile designers, therefore, try to
reduce the probability of detection by minimizing the
missile's radar cross section and IR signature, while mission
planners attempt to avoid flying the missile within line-of-
sight distance of any radars. These goals are accomplished
through miniaturization, stealth construction, flight nath
design, and engine design.
1. Miniaturization
Radar cross section is determined roughly by the
surface area of radar-reflective material oriented toward the
radar antenna. Any action to reduce the size of the cruise
missile generally will reduce the missile's RCS. It was a
fortuitous series of "technological developments in propulsion
units, guidance systems, and warhead design" [Ref. 3:p. 6]
that allowed construction of a small cruise missile by the
United States. Further miniaturization of missile components
and subsystems remains a fruitful means of increasing
survivability of newly designed cruise missiles.
By 1970, the guidance package for U.S. cruise missiles being
considered for development was only one and one-third cubic feet in
size and weighed 115 pounds [Ref. 8:p. 136].
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2. Stealth Construction
Besides decreasing the physical size of the missile,
there are at least two other ways to reduce its RCS. The
first is to construct the missile body of composite materials
which are more absorptive, and therefore less reflective, of
EM energy. The same affect can be achieved through the
application of a coating of highly absorptive material--
stealth paint, in other words--over more traditional airframe
materials.
Radar cross section can also be reduced by
constructing the airframe in such a way that EM energy is
scattered rather than reflected back toward the search radar
antenna. Flat surfaces and the intersections between them
provide especially strong return signals, so stealthy
construction seeks to replace such features with curves and
multifaceted surfaces. The result is much more diffusion of
the already lower level of reflected (vice absorbed) energy.
A basic cruise missile, with aluminum skin and no
stealthy features, will have an RCS on the order of one square
meter [Ref. 3 4 :p. 12]. A more advanced design, incorporating
radar-absorbing material and "eliminat[ing] retro-reflecting
structures," may be capable of achieving a two-orders-of-
magnitude reduction; i.e., 0.01 square meter RCS [Ref. 34:p.
14] . In France, a facility has been planned which will
measure the RCS of newly designed missile systems. The goal
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Iof this facility is to achieve RCS reductions down below
1/1000 of a square meter (-30 dBm). [Ref. 35:p. 472]
3. Flight Path Design
, search radar's basic detection envelope is a
function of two v~riables: range and altitude. 4  Generally
speaking, the lowe- the altitude at which the object flies,
the closer to the radar it must come before it can be
detected. The object must be, in effect, above the radar
horizon.'
A cruise missile's flight path will be designed to
keep the missile below the horizon of any known enemy radar
sites (in particular, air defense radars). This is equally
true for land-attack and advanced anti-ship cruise missiles
(e.g., TASM). Evasion may be accomplished through a broad
range of altitude and distance combinations.
Not all search radar locations are certain to be
known, however. So for added protection, cruise missiles are
designed to fly at extremely low altitudes. This
characteristic not only makes avoidance of known radar sites
easier (by reducing the required stand-off range), but also
increases the missile's probability of survival against
unknown air defense sites. Probability of detection is
' Antenna height, ground return, terrain features and antenna
fade zones also can play a significant role in the shape of the
detection envelope.
r Because of the propagation characteristics of EM energy nPar
the surface of the Earth, radar horizon is about one-third gr_ -r
than the visual horizon.
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decreased and, should a detection occur, reaction time
available to the defensive system will be minimal [Ref. 8:p.
139] . Against targets with terminal defense systems, such as
warships, a sea-skimming approach offers the best chance of
success.
There are, however, two significant drawbacks to
extremely low-altitude flight. First, it is not very fuel-
efficient. The maximum range of an air-breathing engine
propulsion system varies tremendously with air density, which
in turn is a function primarily of altitude. A higher cruise
altitude translates into lighter air, which results in greater
range for the missile.
Second, extreme low-altitude flight over land
imposes the risk of "clobber,": the inadvertant impact of the
missile into an uncharted vertical obstruction. For this
reason, modern cruise missiles such as TLAM are equipped with
a terrain-following system
consist[ing] of a downward looking radar altimeter (also
used by TERCOM) linked to the missile's controls. The
planners set a preplanned separation altitude that is a
tradeoff between flying very low (making detection and
tracking more difficult) and flying at a higher altitude
(with less risk of hitting the ground). The addition of
a forward looking radar... could further lower these
altitudes, but would also add weight, increase complexity,
and radiate a Fignal that defenders could detect. [Ref.
8:p. 139]
Given the premium placed on stealthiness, the installation of
a forward-looking active radar on any new land-attack cruise
missile seems unlikely. It must be noted, however, that many
anti-ship missiles, targeted against fast-moving metallic
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structures at sea, depend heavily upon active radars to
acquire their targets. Ironically, these anti-ship missiles
are much less vulnerable to "clobber" and therefore do not
have any need for a terrain-avoidance radar.
4. Engine Design
In addition to detection by radar, cruise missiles
can be detected and tracked by the infrared energy generated
by their engines. Ballistic missiles and manned aircraft can
be detected in similar fashion. The advantage enjoyed by
cruise missiles in this venue is one of size: a small
turbojet or turbofan engine produces far less heat than an
ICEM or large manned bomber.
Efforts to reduce further the IR signature of cruise
missiles can be expected to continue. Already, the shift from
turbojets--used by the larger, supersonic Soviet designs--to
smaller, subsonic turbofans in the U.S. ALCMs and SLCMs have
resulted in a decrease in engine exhaust gas temperature from
1,450 degrees Farenheit to 600 degrees Farenheit [Ref. 36:p.
2 3,] .
B. AIRFRAME AND PROPULSION
Three basic methods of propulsion have been implemented
successfully for cruise missiles: liquid-fuel rockets,
conventional, jet engines (including turbojets and turbofans),
arid ramjets [Ref. 34:p. 20]. A primary advantage of the
turbine engine designs--increased stealth-- was presented
above. The other factors which are likely to determine the
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selection of a propulsion system for nascent cruise missiles
are the related performance characteristics of range and
speed, and the technological sophistication required to
construct the various systems.
1. Liquid-fueled Rockets
For short-range applications (less than 100 km)
liquid-fueled rockets offer the advantage of simplicity of
design relative to the other options. "For longer ranges,
however, the size and weight imposed by the need to carry
oxidizers, make liquid-propulsion systems infeasible." [Ref.
34:p. 20]
2. Conventional Jet Engines
Turbojets and turbofans, because of their higher
fuel efficiency, are capable of achieving much greater ranges
than rockets. A developing nation, moreover, would not
necessarily require a propulsion system with the technological
sophistication of the Tomahawk. A larger conventional jet
engine could be used, in which a degree of stealthiness is
sacrificed for the sake of lower cost and greater
availability. [Ref. 34:p. 20]
Engines of the size required for cruise missile
applications are marketed by numerous sources including
India, Israel, Japan [and] Poland .... It is also likely
that South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, Spain, and
Brazil have the basic technology required to develop and
build such engines. [Ref. 34:p. 20]
3. Ramjets
A third propulsion option "for applications where
time of flight at long range is a major concern" is th- uiSe of
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a ramjet engine [Ref. 34:p. 20]. A ramjet is "a jet engine,
without moving parts, in which the air for oxidizing the jet
fuel is continuously compressed by being rammed into the inlet
by the high velocity of the aircraft." [Ref. 3-:p. 1175]
Several early U.S. cruise missile designs incorporated ramjet
propulsion without success (e.g., Navajo, Rigel, Regulus II)
[Ref. 8:pp. 98, 100, 117, 131]. The principal advantace of a
ramjet is supersonic speed: the ramjet-propelled Russian Kh-
31 air-to-surface missile, which debuted at the 1991 Dubai Air
Show, allegedly had a cruise speed of almost Mach 4.5, with a
range greater than 100 km [Ref. 38:p. 750].
Regardless of the particular propulsion system chosen,
the parameters to note include size, weight, thrust and
specific fuel consumption (SFC). Size affects stealthiness
and launch platform compatibility (e.g., submarine torpedo
tube launch). The thrust and weight together determine how
large a payload (ordnance, fuel and guidance package) the
missile can deliver. Specific fuel consumption--the amount
"of fuel.. .consumed [in pounds] per hour per pound of thrust
generated" (Ref. 3:p. 6]--is a measure of engine efficiency
which, combined with fuel capacity, determines the missile's
theoretical maximum range.
To provide a reference for comparison, the Williams
Research Corporation turbofan engine used in the Tomahawk and
the ALCM, designated Fi07-WR-100/101, is only twelve inches in
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diameter and weighs 130 pounds. It has an SFC of 0.7 and
generates 600 pounds of thrust [Ref. 3:p. 10].
C. GUIDANCE
"Of all the technologies associated with the cruise
missile, the most crucial is, and always has been, guidance."
[Ref. 8:p. 135] The types of warhead which may be employed
effectivelw, and therefore the missions to which cruise
missiles may be assigned, depend primarily on the accuracy of
the guidance system(s) installed. Such systems may be divided
into three broad categories: initial guidance systems,
midcourse update systems, and terminal guidance systems.
1. Initial Guidance Systems
A wide variety of schemes have already been
mentioned by which a cruise missile might be guided from the
moment of launch. Attempts have been made, with varying
degrees of success, to use command guidance (from either a
ground radar site or an accompanying manned air-raft); a pre-
programmed autopilot or pre-set compass (possibly with stellar
updates); or some form of inertial guidance system.
The effectiveness of inertial systems depends -ipon
the accuracy of the input launch position and the target
position and upon the drift rate of the system. Even the best
inertial systems "drift over time" at a rate of about 750 to
900 meters per hour [Ref. 3:pp. 7-8]. Therefore, inertial
systems by themselves are only practical for cruise missiles
with nuclear warheads or for land-attack missiles with an area
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barrage mission. Even so, the effective range of an all-
inertial guided cruise missile is quite limited.
2. Midcourse Updates
It was for precisely that reason that TERCOM was
developed. TERCOM, described above in Section II, has been
credited in open sources with an accuracy "between 100 and 600
feet, with a 165-foot accuracy supposedly demonstrated in
1960." [Ref. 8:pp. 137-9] The TERCOM system, however,
requires an extensive base of geodetic data which may not be
readily available to many aspiring cruise missile builders and
employers. In any event, there is now a much more cost-
effective alternative: the Global Positioning System, or GPS.
GPS is a U.S.-made precision navigation system with
both military and civilian applications. The heart of GPS is
a constellation of satellites, each of which transmits an
encoded signal containing time, position and orbital data. A
GPS receiver within view of at least four satellites can
determine its own position in three spatial dimensions plus
time. Successive readings, fractions of a second apart,
enable the receiver to compute its instantaneous velocity
[Ref. 3 6 :p. 23].
The accuracy of a GPS receiver depends upon which of
the two transmitted signals--Course/Acquisition (C/A) or
Precision (P) -- it is able to use. The P code is encrypted,
and thus is available only to military receivers with proper
decryption data. The C/A code is unencrypted and available to
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commercial GPS receivers. Such receivers are now readily
available and were invaluable to DESERT STORM forces unable to
obtain the military version. These receivers, "small enough
to fit inside cruise missiles, " have an accuracy on the order
of 100 meters [Ref. 3 9 :p. 49).
The United States plans to install a GPS capability
in the Block III Upgrade to Tomaliawk. Supposedly, GPS
will not improve the missile's terminal navigation
accuracy at the target. And it will not expand the types
of targets it can successfully engage. It will, however,
allow mission routes to be generated over areas where no
TERCOM exists. [Ref. 2:p. 741
Other nations may soon follow suit. At least one
integrated GPS/inertial navigation system is already under
development in a foreign country, albeit for a manned
aircraft. The French company, SAGEM,
has offered [it] to the French government to equip the
Rafale fighter aircraft ....
Later this year, SAGEM will deliver a hybrid GPS/INS
system using Rafale's ring laser gyro nay/attack system,
RL 90, for testing...
The new P(Y) GPS uses an "all-in-view" concept
involving the ability to track all satellites in view
through up to 12 parallel channels. [Ref. 40:p. 559]
It would be reasonable to assume that what is available in
France will soon be available to arms producers worldwide.
The discussion of midcourse guidance systems and GPS
would not be complete without at least mentioning one more
emerging terhnology: differential GPS, or DGPS. DGPS is an
attempt to further improve the accuracy of a GPS-based
position system. It would operate as follows: a GPS receiver
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would be installed in a known, fixed position. It would
receive the transmitted GPS signals, compute its position
based on those signals, and compare that position with its
known, true position. A correction factor could then be
generated and transmitted. Other GPS receivers within
reception range of the master receiver's position could then
apply that same correction to their own GPS-calculated
positions. In this way, any systemic errors (including 
_
deliberately induced ones) could be filtered out.
The manner in which DGPS could be applied to a lori;-
range weapon system such as a cruise missile is not yet clear.
3. Terminal Guidance
The most accurate battle-tested terminal guidance
system for land-attack cruise missiles is, of course, DSMAC.
Yet, like TERCOM, DSMAC has a number of drawbacks. Primary of
these to a developing nation is the requirement for overhead
imagery data even more precise than those used by TERCOM.
Therefore, other methods are likely to be attempted.
One eminently practical homing system is an active
radar. This is the primary means by which most anti-ship
missiles acquire their targets. The technology is proven, it
is readily available, and it requires minimal targeting
information. On the other hand, active radars are not
terribly discriminating,' they are susceptible to electronic
"Lacking very sophisticated data processing, an active radar
terminal guidance system tends to home on the largest target,
raither than the most desirable.
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countermeasures, and they anounce their arrival in an area
rather definitively. Also, they are unsuitable for all but
the most unusual land-attack missions.
A second, closely related method of terminal
guidance is the use of radio frequency (RF) homing. In this
method, a radar receiver is mounted in the missile. Rather
than transmitting its own signal, the missile homes on its
target by detecting and steering toward the target's own radar
or radio transmission. Advantages include a more stealthy
approach, a degree of target discrimination (varying with the
software but much more developed than with active radar), and
feasibility for land-attack missions. The principal
disadvantage of passive RF homing is obvious: if the target
stops transmitting, the missile will lose track on it. (Ref.
34:p. 12]
Passive IR homing is the other method generally
available to a nascent cruise missile developer [Ref. 34:p.
12) . It shares many of the advantages and disadvantages of RF
homing, although its ability to classify targets is much more
uncertain.
D. WARHEAD
1. Relationship Between Warhead and Missile Design
To the battlefield or afloat battle group commander,
it is vital to know the nature of the warhead contained in an
inbound cruise missile. The difference between a nuclear,
chemical, high explosive or other type of cruise missile is a
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matter of tremendous tactical significance to both the
launching and receiving forces. Beyond that truism, though,
the relationship between the warhead and the cruise missile
design can be seen in several ways. These ways include
determination of the missile's size and weight parameters,
guidance system requirements, and the missile's maximum range.
a. Range Requirements
Definition of ranqe requirements is a fairly
straightforward process in itself. By matching anticipated
launch platforms and launch positions with likely targets, and
adjusting for missile maneuverability and safety margins, the
required maximum range practically defines itself. This
requirement then becomes a small cog which drives many wheels.
b. warhead Size and Weight
The size and weiqht of a cruise missile's
warhead are constrained on the high end by the capabilities of
the propulsion system, the maximum range requirement, and by
the degree of stealthiness which the missile's designers wish
to achieve. On the low end there are limits as well. A
nuclear warhead of a particular yield requires a specific
amount of fissile material and shielding. Reducing size and
weight beyond the minimum would defeat the purpose of building
the missile. Likewise, the range of a cruise missile with a
high-explosive warhead could be incrementally increased by
replacing a portion of explosive material with extra fuel. At
some point, though, there is insufficient explosive energy
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remaining for the missile to achieve satisfactory results
against its targets. One of a cruise missile designer's
functions must be to define the limits of such trade-offs.
C. Airframe Volume
Another important consideration is link between
warhead tyree, desired results, and the accuracy required to
achieve those results with the prescribed warhead at the
maximum anticipated range. Trade-offs abound. Space within
the airframe for precision terminal guidance must be taken
from warhead or fuel volume. A bigger warhead means less
precision or shorter range. As an alternative, stealthiness
may he sacrificed in order to fulfill requirements in any of
the other parameters.
How, then, is the selection of warhead type--
nuclear, chemical or high-explosive--reflected in a cruise
missile's other design choices?
2. Effects of Specific Warhead Types
P-rhaps the clooest design link is between the
warhead and the guidance system. As was indicated above, a
small high-explosive warhead like that found in any reasonably
stealthy land-attack cruise missile requires pinpoint
guidance. Chemical weapons, aimed at small areas (such as
troop formations) rather than targeted at points, have more
relaxed guidance requirements. Use of nuclear weapons ashore
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by a Third World nation would likely be countervalue in
nature, and so would have the least restrictive guidance
system requirements. Anti-ship cruise missiles will likely be
guided as in the past: inertial systems for nuclear-armed
ASCMs, with active radar or passive EM or IR homing for more
precise conventional attacks.
Another, looser association exists between warhead
-type and missile range. A chemical weapon, for example, is
not likely to be targeted against anything beyond a couple of
hundred miles away. The missile's time of flight, and the
shifting vulnerability (and possibly even movement) of the
target makes the probability of success for a longer-range
shot too low. The same is true for conventionally-armed anti-
ship cruise missiles. A nuclear warhead targeted against a
city, though, faces no such limitations. Extreme long range
is a pronounced advantage in a nuclear-armed cruise missile.
The pairing of a warhead type with a cruise missile
airframe is not necessarily an exclusive process. The
Tomahawk, for example, uses one common body to house four
substantially different payloads. Close examination, however,
of operational requirements such as design range and CEP, and
7 Countervalue targeting is the employment of weapons,
especially nuclear weapons, against items of intrinsic value to the
opposing society (e.g., population centers, industrial facilities,
etc.). Counterforce targeting implies us? against the opposing
force's military (especially nuclear) capability (e.g., ICBM silos
and strategic bomber bases).
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of design parameters such as size, weight and thrust, can
reveal much about the intentions of the builder.
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V BAYESIAN ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL TOOL
This paper has presented reasons why cruise missile
proliferation and the transfer of missile technology are, or
should be, matters of concern to the United States military
and intelligence communities. It has summarized historical
trends and described the state of the art of operational
cruise missiles. Possible motivations for cruise missile
acquisition or indigenous development have been explored, as
have the specific technological capabilities required to build
a modern, survivable and effective cruise missile.
It is now appropriate to look ahead. Given what is known
about cruise missile systems and their proliferation, a
systematic assessment and forecasting methodology is required.
This methodology should be able to incorporate prior knowledge
with new developments to answer a series of questions about
cruise missiles:
1. What is the present state of development of country A's
existing cruise missile program?
2. Is country B attempting to establish a cruise missile
capability, throuqh either acquisition or indigenous
production?
3. What evidence supports the judgments rendered in
response to questions one and two, above? What evidence
refutes them?
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The essential elements of any methodology proposed to
answer such questions are evidence and systemization. Expert
judgments by informed analysts remain the key to success in
both analysis and forecasting, but even experts often disagree
with one another. Such disagreements logically might arise in
at least two ways: either the analysts are working from two
different bodies of data, or they are interpreting the same
datum points in different ways. The way to resolve such
differences is to establish a system by which data are
collected, sorted, and incorporated into a shared data base.
This data base can then be used as evidence by an analyst to
support his assessment. In this way, disagreements can be
reduced to the meaning and relative weight to be assigned to
a particular datum. Assumptions are forced to be exp2icit.
A. BAYESIAN ANALYSIS
One forecasting methodology which provides an explicit,
quantifiable estimate of future conditions is known as
Bayesian analysis. It derives from the work of the Reverend
Thomas Bayes, a fellow of the British Royal Society. 1is
formula, which dates to 1763,
is a too! of statistical inference, used to deduce the
probabilities of various hypothetical causes from the
observation of a real event. It also provides a
convenient method for recalculating those probabilities in
the light of a continuing flow of new events ....
[T]he 'rule of Bayes' states that the probability of an
underlying cause (hypothesis) equals its previous
probability multiplied by the probability that the
observed event was caused by that hypothesis. [Ref. 41:p.
12]
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A simple example serves to illustrate the method.
Suppose the weatherman on the evening news announces a 60
percent chance of rain by noon the next day. He awakens in
the morning and observes that the sky is overcast and the
barometer has fallen. He revises his forecast at 8:00 AN to
read "75 percent chance of rain." By 10:00 AM, dark
thunderclouds fill half the sky. At that point he assesses
the chance of rain by noon to be 90 percent. How would
Bayesian analysis be applied to computing these forecasts?
The hypothesis (H) to be proven is the occurrence of rain
by noon the next day (call this outcome Hl). The alternative
hypothesis (H2) is that it will not rain by noon. The "prior
probability" of Hl is the initial forecast of a 60 percent
chance of rain (P(Hl) = 0.60) . The other hypothesis, of
course, has a 40 percent probability (P(H2) = 0.40).1
For each new observation, or event (E) , a series of
judgments are made by the expert: what -s the probability
that this event would occur if the first hypothesis (H1) is
true? If H2 is true? The product of each hypothesis' prior
probabilicy, P(Hi), and event probability, P(E/Hi) (the
probability of E, given the truth of Hi) , is then computed and
the results, for all hypotheses, are added together.
The revised, or posterior, probability for any
hypothesis, given the occurrence of the new datum point, can
1 There may be any number of alternative hypotheses, b,'t they
must be mutually exclusive and the sum of their probabilities must
always add to unity.
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then be computed by multiplying the prior probability of that
hypothesis by the ratio between the event probability from
that hypothesis and the previously computed summation.
Returning -) the weather forecast, suppose that on 80
percent of days on which it rains by noon (in this particular
location), the sky is overcast by 8:00 AM. Does this mean
that the chance of rain is now (as of 8:00 AM on the day in
question) 80 percent? No! It could be that the skies are
also overcast here on 70 percent of the mornings that it does
n:• rain by noon (or, for that matter, on 90 percent of them)
Applying the "rule of Bayes" to the occurrence, E, of an
cvercast sky at 8:00 AM, the products of each event
probability and related hypothesis probability are computed
and summed. P(Hl), which is 0.60, is multiplied by P(E/Hl),
which is 0.80, to yield 0.48. P(H2), or 0.40, is multiplied
by P(E/H2), or 0.70, to yield 0.28. The sum, 0.48 plus 0.28,
is 0.76.
The revised probability of rain by noon (HI) can then be
calculated by multiplying the prior probability (0.60) by the
ratio of P(E/Hl), 0.80, to the sum, 0.76. The :esuiting
updated forecast is a 63 percent chance of rain by noon. The
original 60 percent chance has been revised upward by a factor
of (0.80/0.76).
While the above example is deliberately simple, more
complex applications abound. The Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) began exploring the use of Bayesian analysis as a
57
forecasting tool in the mid-1970s with the personal support of
then-C:A director William Colby [Ref. 41:p. 3]. The CIA used
Bayesian analysis as an Indications and Warning (I&W) tool in
order to assess the likelihood of hostilities in a number of
different regional situations.- The results were, on the
whole, encouraging. Although it is likely that "the narrative
essay will remain the dominant form for intelligence
estimates" within CIA, " [t)here is, however, an important role
for rigorous procedures...in... complex estimative problems."
[Ref. 41:p. 9]
When the CIA applied Bayesian analysis to the forecasting
of politico-military events, they also incorporated another
technique, known as Delphi. Developed by the RAN. orporation
in the late 1940s, Delphi is a means to utilize the knowledge
of iumber of experts independently from one another. In the
CIA's experience, Delphi and Bayesian analysis were highly
complementary. [Ref. 42:p. 15]
The actual manner in which Bayesian analysis was applied
at the CIA can be seen in the following exampile, which
rvolved forecasting hostilities in the Middle East.
On the first day of the period, each of a number of
participating analysts submits the items of evidence he or
she has seen since the last round which relate in any way
to possible hostilities in the Middle East. The
submission is in the form of one or two sentences
These situations included, for exan-.ple, the possibilities of
"a North Vietnamese offensive during the dry season of
.Sino-Soviet hostilities...and Arab Israel hostilities from
AW,,ut n 1974 to Sumamer 1976." [Ref. 42:p. 19]
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summarizing the item, along with the date, source, and the
classification.
The choice of data is left entirely to the analyst, who
is instructed to include anything he considers relevant
and to exclude what can be judged to be irrelevant. Later
the same day, a coordinator consolidates the items,
resolving differences of wording, emphasis, and meaning,
and returns the complete list of items to all
participants. The analysts, working individually,
evaluate the items and return the numerical assessments
the following day. This information is then collated and
disseminated as an intelligence report. [Ref. 42:pp. 16-
17]
In the experience of the CIA, Bayesian analysis was shown
to have distinct advantages over more intuitive assessments.
These advantages include:
(1) More information can be extracted from the available
data.. .and probabilities are not at the mercy of the most
recent or most visible item.
(2) The formal procedure has been shown to be less
conservative than the analysts' informal opinions, and to
drive the probabilities away from fifty-fifty faster and
farther than the analysts' overall subjective judgments
do....
(3) The procedure provides a reproducible sequence for
arriving at the final figures ....
(4) The formulation of the questions forces the analyst
to consider alternative explanations of the evidence he
sees.. . [and] to look at how well the evidence explains
hypotheses other than the one he has already decided is
the most likely.
(5) The use of quantified judgments allows the results of
the analysis to be displayed on a numerical scale, rather
trtw through the use of [subjective terms]. [Ref. 42:p.
2:A1
There are, however, "definite limitations" to the
Bayesian forecasting technique.
(1) The question must lend itself to formulation in
mutually exclusive categories ....
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(2) The question must be expressed as a specific set of
hypothetical outcomes.
(3) There should be a fairly rich flow of data which is
at least peripherally related to the question.
(4) The question must revolve around the type of activity
that produces preliminary signs and is not largely a
chance or random event. [Ref. 42:pp. 25-26]
From the advantages and limitations outlined above, the
ways in which Bayesian analysis (with Delphi) can be applied
to the problem of cruise missile proliferation can be deduced.
For the purpose of forecasting, the hypotheses to be tested
must be explicitly defined in mutually exclusive terms. For
example:
1. By 1995, country A will possess a land-attack cruise
missile capability; OR
by 1995, country A will not possess a land-attack cruise
missile capability.
2. The cruise missile system being developed by country B
will be:
A. a nuclear-armed land attack weapon, OR
B. a tactical land-attack weapon with a chefnical
warhead, OR
C. an anti-ship cruise missile with a high-explosive
warhead.
3. The cruise missile system being considered for
production in country C:
A. will be offered for export by 1994, OR
B. will not be offered for export by 1994.
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In order to achieve satisfactory results, fulfillment of
at least one of the hypotheses must require an adequate
sequence of definable preliminary steps. Data relating to
those events must be available. Whenever possible, a time
horizon should be included. This horizon may be extended at
will, but most data are time-sensitive to some degree, and
should be reevaluated whenever the time factor is amended.
[Ref. 42:p. 28]
While Bayesian analysis is intended to be a forecasting
tool, there is an added benefit to its implementation. The
information base required--raw data, sorted by country and by
weapon system, with an analyst's qualitative remarks on source
reliability and quantitative assessment of explanatory
hypotheses--is an excellent reference source for any urgent
demands for "snapshot" program evaluations (e.g., where is
country A's missile program right now).
B. THE IMP DATABASE
Databases very similar to the one described above have
already been created. One such database, operating at an
unclassified level, is maintained at the Monterey Institute cf
International Studies (MIIS) in Monterey, California. It was
established to support the International Missile Proliferation
(IMP) Project, headquartered at the Institute.
1. Purpose
The purpose of the IMP, as stated in the
introduction to its periodical publication, Missile Monitor,
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is to collect, analyze and disseminate data and
information on the motivations, capabilities, and patterns
of trade of missile-prcliferating states in the developing
world. [Ref. 43:p. 2)
2. Sources
The IMP collects data from an expanding list of
diverse sources. It receives on-line feeds from the wire
services, including AP, UPI and Reuters. IMP also subscribes
to all the major U.S. daily newspapers (e.g., New York Times,
Washinaton Post, Los Aneles Times) and several foreign
papers, as well. Additionally, the IMP subscribes to the
Federal News Service, which assembles information released
from the federal agencies (such as the Departments of State
and Defense) and catalogues it by codeword (e.g., "nuclear,"
"missile"). The IMP staff searches all the major defense and
military technology journals for data, as well as Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) products. As the users
of the IMP database themselves have proliferated, another
source of datum inputs has become available. Some of the
users suLrit items which they come across in sources (such as
foreign language newspapers) not routinely checked by the IMP
staff. (Ref. 44]
3. Structure
Potential sources of data are screened by area
specialists on the IMP staff. Specific items of interest are
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coded' for entry into the database, and the screener prepares
a narrative abstract of the reference material. He or she
also has the option of entering qualifying comments or
supplementary information. The resulting document
(bibliographical reference, abstract, commentary and data
codes) is reviewed for accuracy by another staff member and a
supervisor before being assigned a sequential document number
and keyed into the computerized database. [Ref. 44)
Information within the database may then be accessed
by any of over 300 category codes or over 200 country or
mulci-country group codes [Ref. 45) . Abstracts of data
sources, with bibliographic information, may be printed out by
document number.
4. Applicability
The structure of the IMP database--its
chronological, event-by-event format, its diversity of
sources, and its detailed categorization and cross-referencing
potential--makes it nearly a perfect foundation for the
conduct of Bayesian analysis. A similar database, identically
structured but cleared to contain both classified and
unclassified information, would be ideal.
Applying the database to the problem of forecasting
cruise missile proliferation or indigenous production, the
following steps should be taken:
-Examples of coding categories are country, weapon system,
technological field, and interactive event (e.g., comment, denial,
proposal, payment, delivery). [Ref. 45]
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1. Define a specific set of mutually exclusive hypotheses,
which include the outcome of concern and all logical
alternatives. Define a specific time horizon.
2. Assign one or more subject-matter experts (area or
technical specialists) to the problem.
3. Each analyst, independently, conduct a review of
existing data and assign probabilities to each hypothetical
outcome. These probabilities must sum to unity.
4. Each analyst, evaluate new events as they are added to
the data base, assigning quantitative probabilities to the
event with respect to each hypothesis.
5. Each analyst, compute the revised (posterior)
probabilities, which then become the new prior probabilities,
for each hypothesis.
6. Periodically compare the assessments of the individual
analysts, identify major differences of opinion, resolve them
if possible (and if desired), and report the range of
forecasts regarding the subject of concern (with appropriate
narrative explanation based on the evidence).
7. When appropriate, redefine the timeline and hypothetical
outcomes and revise the prior probabilities of each hypothesis
in light of all known data.
C. INDICATORS OF POSSIBLE CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
With the existence of a database such as the one
established for the International Missile Proliferation
Project, it is already possible to apply Bayesian analysis to
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the forecasting of cruise missile proliferation. Having
described the method and the database, it is appropriate to
conclude this section with a summary of specific datum points
which would be relevant to the analysis of a nascent cruise
missile program.'
1. Basic Science and Technology
- Aerodynamic design technology--for basic airframe design
- Computational fluid dynamics--for high-lift/low-drag
designs
- Supercomputers--for airframe and warhead modeling
- Miniaturized computers--for onboard guidance and control
- Charge-coupled devices--for electro-optical imagery
- Analog-to-digital conversion devices
- Structural composites, laminates, and radar-absorbing
materials
2. Airframe and Propulsion Technology
- Aerodynamic flight controls
- Liquid rocket motors
- Solid rocket motors and boosters
- Conventional jet propulsion systems
- Lightweight turbojet/turbofan/propfan engines
- Ramjet/scramIet engines
SThe following list represents a composite summary of the
body of this report. Sources most heavily drawn upon to provide
individual items in the list are references 34 and 45.
Scramjet: "[s(upersonic) c(ombustion) ramjeti a ramiet that
burns its fuel in an airstream moving at supersonic speed." [Ref.
B,:p. 1279]
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- Surveillance, reconnaissance and target drones
- Remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVs)
- Missile propellants
3. Guidance Technology
- Preprogrammed autopilots and gyrocompasses
- Command guidance capabilities (i.e., radar/radio control)
- Passive radio frequency (RF) homing
- Passive infrared (IR) homing
- TV imaging/homing
- Laser homing
- Compact active radar systems
- Gyroscopic systems
- Ring laser gyroscopes
- Accelerometers
- Inertial navigation systems and software
- Radar altimeters
- Terrain mapping/TERCOM capability, or access to data
- Digital optical imaging




- Nuclear weapons capability
- Chemical weapons capability
- Biological weapons capability
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- Advanced conventional weapons capabilities [e.g., fuel-air
explosives (FAEs), cluster bombs]
- High-explosive warheads
- Safing, arming, fuzing and firing mechanisms [e.g., point-
detonating, delayed point-detonating (i.e., penetrating),
proximity]
5. Production and Testing Facilities/Capabilities
- Wind tunnel/aerodynamic flow field visualization chamber
- Radar cross section (RCS) measurement facility (especially
one sized for cruise missile dimensions)
- Radar and/or optical tracking range for missile test
flights
- Fixed-site missile launch facility
- Mobile missile launch facility [e.g., transporter-erector-
launcher (TEL)]
- Cruise missile air-launch and/or sea-launch capability
- Missile or missile component production plants
6. Strategic, Diplomatic and Economic Factors
- Existence of military conflict or regional arms race
- Possession of cruise missiles by neighboring country
- Possession or pursuit of ballistic missiles o: long-range
strike aircraft by subject nation or its neighbors
- Stated missile import/export policies
- Membership in non-proliferation regimes, especially the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
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- Budgetary constraints, foreign debt, and international
balance of payments conditions
- Economic development programs in effect (e.g., import
substituting industrialization, export substitution)
7. "Interactive' 6 Events
- Public or private comments by political, military or
industrial leaders implying the necessity for cruise missiles,
long-range weapons, advanced conventional weapons or weapons
of mass destruction
- Meetings between representatives of nations which have
such weapon systems, or supporting technologies, and nations
which do not
- Contractual arranaements for the acquisition of applicable
weapon systems or technologies (e.g., proposals, requests,
refusals, negotiations, withdrawals, orders, payments or
deliveries)
- Establishment of multinational programs i:r development or
testing of missile systems, or shared use of testing
facilities
8. Miscellaneous
National budget allocations specifically related to cruise
missile acquisition or development programs
- Observed cruise missile deployments, test flights, or
actual employment in combat
Term used by IMP analysts to describe observable or
reportable transactions related to weapons proliferation.
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VI BAYESIAN ANALYSIS: A SAMPLE APPLICATION
This chapter presents a scenario to demonstrate the
manner in which Bayesian analysis could be applied to cruise
missile proliferation. This scenario is hypothetical; any
resemblance to a specific developing nation is ccincidental.
A. SCENARIO
It is January 1993. The nation of Parador is suspected
of planning to develop an indigenous production capability for
a long-range land-attack cruise missile armed with a chemical
warhead.
Parader and its neighbor, Combatistan, are beth emerging
from a long period of colonial rule. They are both net
:mporters of manufactured goods, relying on massive exports of
raw materials (minerals and agricultural products) to maintain
a stable but slightly negative balance of trade.
In recent years, Combatistan has developed a fairly large
standing army backed by a capable close air support element.
!t has done so through the aid *f certain European industrial
nations that have mining interests in the region.
Ownership of a small but possibly valuable strip of
mineral-rich land along the Paradori-Combatistani border is in
dispute. Border incidents have flared up occasionally. It is
obvious that Parador is militarily inferior to Combatistan.
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The official position of the United States is neutrality.
There is, howevex, a large population of expatriate Americans
in Combatistan, most of whom are employees of multinational
mining companies. The Americans are concentrated in the
capital city of Miletus, which is located approximately 600
kilometers from the disputed border region.
The United States government is concerned that Parador
will develop a long-range cruise missile system which could be
used to deliver chemical warheads targeted against
Combatistani population centers, including the capital,
thereby placing the Americans there at great risk.
B. HYPOTHETICAL ALTERNATIVES
The following two hypotheses are proposed for testing:
. Hypothesis Hl: Parador will develop an indigenous
production capability for a land-attack cruise missile armed
with a chemical warhead by December 1994.
2. Hypothesis H2: Parador will not develop an indigenous
production capability for a land-attack cruise missile armed
with a chemical warhead by December 1994.
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIOR PROBABILITIES
Parador area specialists and cruise missile technical
experts make an initial assignment of probabilities based upon
the following evidence:
1. Parador is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), but it has consistently refused to join any
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other non-proliteration regime. According to the Paradori
Foreign Minister, "we are a peaceful nation, uninvolved in
such matters."
2. Parador has three large chemical manufacturing and
processing facilities. Two of these facilities produce
fertilizers and other commercial proaucts for domestic
consumption and export. The third facility is medicinal in
nature. Parador denies any chemical weapon production
capability (r possession of any chemical weapon stockpiles.
3. Parador has a sLate-run final assembly plant for the
production of small turboprop passenger aircraft and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). Most of the manned airc: ,ft are
exported, but the UAVs are allocated predominantly for the
small Paradori air force. The Paradori government is
negotiating with the component-supplier nation for local
licensed production of the airframe and engine components.
Parador offers inexpensive labor in return for technical plans
and advisory personnel.
4. Parador has no indigenous arms manufacturing capability.
t imports all of its military hardware (except for the UAVs).
it does, however, have a small explosives and ammunition
factory adjacent to one of the fertilizer production plants.
This factory produces small arms ammunition, land mines and
artillery shells.
5. The Paradori military uses its fleet of UAVs for border
surveillance and reconnaissance. These UAVs are radio-
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controlled and equipped with TV cameras which feed video back
to the controller on the ground.
After careful consideration of the situation] in Parador,
the team of analysts assigns the following prior
probabilit2 'qs:
1. P(Hl,. 0.35
2. P(H2)- : 0.65
- The total of all probabilities sums to one, as it always must
do.
Three analysts then are assigned to conduct independent
Bayesian analyses on the developing situation in Parador, each
analyst starting with the collectively determined prior
probabilities. One analyst's event-by-event analysis is
reproduced below.
D. EVENT-BY-EVENT BAYESIAN ANALYSIS
1. February 1993 (Source: Aviation Week & Space
Technolog,): Parador signs licensed co-production agreement
for aircraft engines arid UAV airframes. Paradori Minister of
Finance states need to start producing more manufactured goods
for export.
P(Hi): G.3) P(E/Hl) : 0.65 P(HIl) x P(E/Hl) : 0.228
P(H2): 0.65 P(E/H2): 0.60 P(H2) x P(E/H2) : 0.390
Sum: 0.618
Rev:sed P(Hl) : C.35 x (0.65/0.6l8) = 0.37
Revised P(H2): 0.65 x (0.60/0.618) = 0.63
2. February 1993 (Washington Post): The United States
Congress, after heavy lobbying by the automotive industry and
transportation firms, agrees to forbid the use of "Selective
Availability" on GPS satellite transmissions. "Selective
Availability" had been used by the United States military to
intentionally degrade the accuracy of the GPS C/A signal.
P(Hl): 0.37 P(E/Hl): 0.50 P(HI) x P(E/Hl): 0.185
P(H2): 0.63 P(E/H2): 0.50 P(H2) x P(E/H2): 0.315
Sum: 0.500
Revised P(Hl): 0.37 x (0.50/0.50) = 0.37
Revised P(H2): 0.63 x (0.50/0.50) = 0.63
3. April 1993 (classified source) : Paradori military
demonstrates an RF homing capability on a specially modified
UAV.
P(Hi): 0.37 P(E/Hl): 0.60 P(Hl) x P(E/Hl) : (.222
F(H2): 0.63 P(E/iH2): 0.25 P(H2) x P(E/H2) : J.158
Sum: 0.380
Revised P(Hl): 0.37 x (0.60/0.380) = 0.58
Revised P(H2): 0.63 x (0.25/0.380) = 0.42
4. May 1993 (Jane's Defence Weekly): Parador contracts to
buy 300 combined INS/GPS systems from French firm Rafale.
P(Hl): 0.58 P(E/HIl): 0.60 P(Hl) x P(E/HIl) : 0.348
P(H2): 0.42 P(E/H2): 0.50 P(H2) x P(E/H2) : 0.210
Sum: 0.558
Revised P(-il): 0.58 x (0.60/0.558) = 0.62
Revised P(H2): 0.42 '0.50/0.558) = 0.38
5. !ptember 199n (Flight Intrnational) : Parador
establishes radar tracking range adjacent to netional airport
for flight testing of indigenously-produced UAVs.
P(H1) : 0.62 P(E/Hi): 0.65 P01l) x P(E/Hl) : 0.403
P(H2) : 0.38 P(E/H2): 0.50 P(H2) x PiE/H2) : 0.190
Sum: 0.593
Revised P(Hl): 0.62 x (0.65/0.593) = 0.68
Revised P(H2): 0.38 x (0.50/0.593) = 0.32
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6. September 1993 (classified source): Funding for
Paradori military UAV program has tripled within a two-year
span. The additional money has come from cuts in other
military programs.
P (Il) : 0.68 PýE/HI): 0.70 P(Hl) x P(E/Hl) : 0.476
P(H2) : 0.32 P(E/H2): 0.20 P(H2) x P(E/H2): 0.064
Sum: 0.540
Revised P(Hl): 0.68 x (0.70/0.540) = 0.88
Revised P(H2): 0.32 x (0.20/0.540) = 0.12
7. November 1993 (Jane's Defence Weekly) : Rafale delivers
60 INS/GPS sets to Parador, promising 120 more within six
months.
P(HI) : 0.88 P(E/Hl): 0.50 P(Hl) x P(E/Hl) : 0.44
P(H2): 0.12 P(E/H2): 0.50 P(H2) x P(E/H2) : 0.06
Sum: 0.50
Revised P(Hl): 0.88 x (0.50/0.50) = 0.88
Revised P(H2): 0.12 x (0.50/0.50) = 0.12
8. January 1994 (U.S. Defense Attache, Parador) : Parador
demonstrates a low-level, terrain-following capability in its
UAVs. A UAV apparently was fitted with a radar altimeter and
simple computerized flight controls.
P-Il) : 0.88 P(E/Hl): 0.80 P(Hl) x P(E/Hl): 0.704
P(U12) : 0.12 P(E/H2): 0.60 P(H2) x P(E/H2): 0.072
Sum: 0.776
Revised P(Hl) : 0.88 x (0.80/0.776) = 0.91
Revised P(H2): 0.12 x (0.60/0.776) = 0.09
9. January 1994 (Parador National Press Agency [ANPP]):
Parador begins full-scale indigenous production of UAVs for
commercial and military use and for export.
PiHi) 0.91 P(E/H .'-1 0.75 P(Hl) x P(L'/Hl): 0.683
P(,.2) : 0.09 P(E/H2 : 0.75 P(H2) x P(E/H2) : 0.067
Sum: 0.750
Revised P(Hl): 0.91 x (0.75/0.75) = 0.91
Revised P(H2): C.09 x (0.75/0.75) = 0.09
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10. February 1994 (New York Times): In a nationally-
broadcast radio address, Parador's President-for-Life
announces that his country is a peace-loving nation but that
it is prepared to defend itself if necessary.
P(Hl): 0.91 P(E/HI): 0.40 P(HI) x P(E/H1): 0.364
P(H2): 0.09 P(E/H2) : 0.90 P(H2) x P(E/H2): 0.081
Sum: 0.445
Revised P(Hl): 0.91 x (0.40/0.445) = 0.82
Revised P(H2): 0.09 x (0.90/0.445) = 0.18
11. April 1994 (U.S. Defense Attache, Parador) : On
National Day, Parador's military displays a mobi le
transporter/launcher/control facility for military
reconnaissance UAVs.
P(Hl): 0.82 P(E/Hl) : 0.80 P(Hl) x P(E/Hl): 0.656
P(H2): 0.18 P(E/H2) : 0.30 P(H2) x P(E/H2): 0.054
Sum: 0.710
Revised P(Hl) : 0.82 x (0.80/0.71) = 0.92
Revised P(H2) : 0.18 x (0.30/0.71) = 0.08
12. April 1994 (Reuters): The commanding general of the
Paradori military, speaking at a National Day parade,
threatens "dire consequences" if Comdbatistan tries to occupy
the disputed territory.
P(Hl): 0.92 P(E/H!) : 0.70 P(HI) x P(E/Hl) : 0.644
P(H2): 0.08 P(E/H2) : 0.40 P(H2) x P(E/H2): C-32
Sum: 0.676
Revised P(Hl) : 0.92 x (0.70/0.676) = 0.95
Revised P(H2) : 0.08 x (0.40/0.676) = 0.05
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13. June 1994 (Parador National Press Agency, front page)
in a large-scale military exercise, the Paradori military
demonstrates their capability to deploy, launch and control
two dozen UAVs with effective two-way exchange of command and
control information between the individual UAV launchers and
the central military command.
P(Hl): 0.95 P(E/HIl): 0.90 P(Hl) x P(E/Hl): 0.855
P(H2): 0.05 P(E/H2): 0.10 P(H2) x P(E/H2) : 0.005
Sum: 0.860
Revised P(HI): 0.95 x (0.90/0.86) = 0.99Revised P(H2): 0.05 x (0.10/0.86) = 0.01
On 01 July 1994, in response to the increasing tensions
between Combatistan and Parador, the Paradorian cruise missile
action team (PCMAT) is reassembled and each analyst presents
the results of his or her Bayesian forecasting procedures.
While there is some disagreement on the precise numerical
value, each member of the team concurs that there is a high
probability that Parador has, or soon will have, a land-attack
cruise missile capability. The evidence is insufficient to
determine whether the missile will be fitted with a chemical
warhead or whether the Paradori government has the will to use
such a weapon.
E. CASE STUDY LESSONS LEARNED
Several valuable insights can be gleaned from the
scenario which unfolded above. Bayesian analysis is a
forecasting tool, not a panacea. It is intended to be used in
conjunction with other analytica'. methods, including
(especially!) the sound judgment of subject matter experts.
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The gualitative value of the probabilities qenerated by the
technique is utterly dependent on the soundness of the
underlying hypotheses and on the analyst's ability to assign
meaningful probabilities to events as they unfold. Some
aspects of _ntelligence analysis undoubtedly are not amenable
to this type of quantification. It is the responsibility of
the intelligence professional to make this determination.
What does it mean for the hypothetical analyst to arrive
at a 99 percent probability that the first hypothesis is
valid? It means only that the overwhelming preponderance of
the evidence available tended to supoort that hypothesis more
stronaly than it did the alternative hypothesis. Each time an
analyst assigns a higher event probability [P(E/H)] to HI than
to H2, the posterior probability of 1l will increase.
In the example above, the trend of the numeriral values
is probably more important than the numbers themselves. The
real value of the quantification should emerge when the
analysts sit down together to compare notes. Do they all
ag-ee on the trend? Do they agrae about which events caused
che greatest shifts in the relative likelihood of each
hypothesis? It is in answering these questions that the
discipline of numerical evaluations should pay the greatest
dividends.
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VII CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Bayesian analysis is one of many techniques available for
intelligence assessments and forecasting. Its principal
advantage is the quanLification of potentially vague verbal
expressions by the formulation of alternative hypotheses and
the estimation of probabilities relating these hypotheses to
observed consequences. The success of the method depends
primarily upon the ability to devise realistic, comprehensive
hypothetical causes and to assign meaningful probabilities to
these causes upon the observation of pertinent events. Such
abilities require in-depth, even expert, knowledge of the
subject which is the focus of the analysis.
With respect to cruise missiles, pertinent topics for any
Bayesian analyst include the historical development of such
weapons (for better perspective); the many, sometimes
conflicting motives which drive weapons procurement programs;
and the particular technologies (e.g., stealth, propulsion,
and guidance systems) which are essential to construction of
a modern cruise missile. Each or these topics has been
addressed in a section of this report.
lo successfully use Bayesian analysis, it is essential to
understand the Bayesian technique, and to appreciate the
strengths and potential drawbacks of the technique,
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specifically when it is applied to political and military
forecasting problems. These issues were explored in the two
preceding sections.
B. IMPLICATIONS
A larger question remains unanswered. Suppose Bayesian
analysis proves to be an effective means of projecting the
direction of weapons development progrums in general, and of
a cruise missile program in particular. How can this
information be utilized by national-level policymakers to help
guide them in their decision-making processes?
Upon the determination that another country is developing
a threatening cruise missile capability, the United States
government has a number of alternatives. It may impose
unilateral export controls in an attempt to limit the
diffusion of exclusively American technology. More
effectively, the U.S. government can initiate or enter into
multilateral non-proliferation agreements (such as the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which the United States
joined in April 1987).
The United States also has the option of pursuing more
energetic strategies. If selling, buying or building cruise
missiles solves a particular problem for a nation, then
perhaps the United States can offer another, less threatening
or destabilizing solution. This solution may take the form of
increased aid for economic development, entry into a
bilateral security pact, or arbitration of a long-strar-ining
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regional dispute. By enabling early identification of a
proliferant's course of action, and by suggesting the root
causes for such action, Bayesian forecasting and the
complementary Delphi method mentioned previously might serve
well the interests of the United States government.
A final policy option is available in those instances in
which moral suasion and mutual self-interest have failed to
prevent the development of dangerous weapon systems. If
another nation successfully mates a weapon of mass destruction
(e.g., a nuclear or chemical warhead) with an effective
delivery vehicle, such as a reliable, survivable cruise
missile, then drastic action may be deemed necessary. A
preemptive military strike may be orderAd to neutralize one or
more aspects of the newly-developed offensive capability.
Such an aggressive action as a preemptive strike has
profound moral, legal and diplomatic ramifications. It is
something to be avoided, if possible. While a Bayesian
analysis or other forecasting tool might uncover the evidence
which leads to a preemptive strike, it is the author's hope
that precise and accurate intelligence forecasting can help
obviate the need for such reactionary policy choices.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This report has introduced the concept of applying
Bayesian analysis to forecas.. cruise missile proliferat:on.
It is by no means a definitive study. Several avenues of
additional research present themselves:
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1. Expand and elaborate the list of indicators of cruise
missile development, using historical cases to provide
guidance for the quantification of event probabilities.
2. Perform a Bayesian analysis of an actual, completed (or
nearly completed) case of cruise missile proliferation or
indigenous production. Target nations for such studies
include (but are not limited to) China, North Korea, Israel,
South Africa and Taiwan.
3. Establish an ongoing real-time Bayesiant analysis for a
specific, nascent cruise missile developer.
4. Define more precisely the nature of hypotheses which may
be applied to cruise missile forecasting problems and are
amenable to the Bayesian method.
5. Conduct a comparative analysis of Bayesian forecasting
and other methods presently used by the Unirted States
intelligence community.
Cruise missiles and the technologies required to produce
them are not going away. It is likely that they will continue
to proliferate. One purnose of intelligence forecasting,
including the technique desciibed herein, is to ensure that
the United States governmi:nt is not surprised by such
developments. Bayesian analysis represents one promising
method to minimize or avoid surprises; there are certainly
others. With consistent applicaticn, the "rule of Bayes" can
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